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Abstract
First, this Article reviews policymakers’ and commentators’ categorization of participants in
Operation Enduring Freedom, the armed conflict in Afghanistan against al Qaeda and Taliban
fighters. This Article concentrate specifically on the status of participants operating at the fringes
of the categories of persons protected by the Geneva Conventions. It shows, for example, how
al Qaeda and the Taliban fighters tested the bounds of the Conventions by employing methods of
“warfare” which rendered them non-distinct and therefore made a determination of their status
unclear. This Article demonstrates how policymakers and ultimately the U.S. President created
a class of persons–so-called extra-conventional persons–who participated in hostilities yet failed
to qualify for protection under any of the applicable Geneva Conventions. Second, this Article
presents the training and education available to the judge advocates who faced these legal issues.
it further presents perspectives on the law of war as it appeared from the resources, education,
and training commonly available to deployed judge advocates. This Article ultimately concludes
that international law and U.S. military doctrine classify many who participate in hostilities as
“protected persons” under the Fourth Geneva Convention–a concept ultimately at odds with the
determination made by U.S. policymakers.Third, and in concert with the two issues identified
above, this Article describes the enormous challenges these issues created for U.S. military per-
sons participating in Operation Iraqi Freedom. Specifically, it illustrates operational and legal
challenges faced by military attorneys and the commanders they advised. It then explores legal
issues that arose during the detention and occupation operations with respect to fighters associated
with Saddam Fedayeen. Observing apparent similarities between Saddam Fedayeen and Taliban
fighters earlier categorized as extra-conventional, this Article describes how, despite similarities
in applicable law and attributes, judge advocates determined that these irregular fighters were pro-
tected persons under the Fourth Geneva Convention. It concludes that judge advocates dealt with
these challenges responsibly, providing sound legal advice that balanced commanders’ mission
requirements with the humanitarian spirit of the law of war.
HOSTILE PROTECTED PERSONS OR
"EXTRA-CONVENTIONAL PERSONS:", HOW
UNLAWFUL COMBATANTS IN THE WAR ON
TERRORISM POSED EXTRAORDINARY
CHALLENGES FOR MILITARY ATTORNEYS
AND COMMANDERS
Lt. Col. Paul E. KantwiUl2 & Maj. Sean Watts3
1. We use the term "extra-conventional persons" to refer to classes of persons that
policymakers and commentators have concluded do not fall within the enumerated
categories of persons who enjoy protection under the law of war. See, e.g., Richard R.
Baxter, So-Called "Unprivileged Belligerency": Spies, Guerillas, and Saboteurs, 28 BRIT. Y.B.
INT'L L. 323, 326-28 (1951); Jason Callen, Unlawful Combatants and the Geneva
Conventions, 44 VA.J. INr'L L. 1025, 1028 (2004); DerekJinks, The Declining Significance of
POW Status, 45 HARV. INT'L L.J. 367, 367-68 (2004). The term is borrowed primarily
from human rights law writers who identify protections and rights not found in treaties
or conventions, but rather grounded in so-called "extra-conventional" sources such as
ad hoc rapporteurs and international commissions. See, e.g., Jose Ayala-Lasso, Making
Human Rights a Reality in the 21st Century, 10 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 497, 498 (1996); Dinah
Shelton, The Boundaries of Human Rights Jurisdiction in Europe, 13 DuKEJ. COMp. & INT'L
L. 95, 107 (2003). We are unaware of prior published use of this term to refer to
unprotected persons in the context of armed conflict.
2. Chair and Professor, International and Operational Law Department, The
Judge Advocate General's Legal Center and School, Charlottesville, Va. Previous as-
signments include: Legal Assistance Attorney/Chief, Claims Division, 1st Armored Divi-
sion, Nuremberg, Germany, 1990; 1st Armored Division, Operation Desert Shield/
Storm, Saudi Arabia, 1990-1991; Trial Counsel, 1st Armored Division, Germany, 1991-
1992; Trial Counsel/Senior Trial Counsel, 3d Infantry Division, Germany, 1992-1993;
Senior Defense Counsel, 24th Infantry Division and Fort Stewart, Ga., 1993-1996; Direc-
tor, Training and Support, Center for Law and Military Operations, T.J.A.G.S.A., 1996-
1998; Officer-in-Charge, 1st Infantry Division, Katterbach, Germany, 1999-2001; Chief,
Military Justice, 1st Infantry Division, Wuerzburg, Germany, 2001-2002; Deputy Staff
Judge Advocate, 1st Infantry Division, Wuerzburg, Germany, 2002-2003; and Student,
Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, Kan., 2003-2004. B.A., Loyola
University of Chicago, 1983; J.D., Loyola University of Chicago School of Law, 1986;
LL.M., The Judge Advocate General's School, 1999. The Authors wish to express spe-
cial thanks to Maj. Thomas A. Wagoner, Maj. Derek Grimes, and Maj. Frank Vila of the
International Law Department faculty for their invaluable review and comments. Any
remaining errors are, of course, the Authors' alone.
3. Professor, International and Operational Law Department, The Judge Advocate
General's Legal Center and School, Charlottesville, Va. Previous assignments include:
Chief of Claims, Trial Defense Counsel, Fort Lewis, Wash.; Chief of International and
Operational Law, 2nd Infantry Division, Republic of Korea; Platoon Leader and Execu-
tive Officer, 1-33 Armor Battalion, Fort Lewis, Wash.; and 3-77 Armor Battalion, Mann-
heim, Germany. B.A., University of Colorado, 1992; J.D., College of William & Mary,
1999, Notes Editor, William & Mary Law Revieur, LL.M., U.S. ArmyJudge Advocate Gen-
eral's School, 2004. The views expressed in this Article are solely those of the Authors
and do not reflect the views of the Department of Defense ("DOD") or The Judge
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INTRODUCTION
The storm of controversy that has surrounded international
legal issues associated with the Global War on Terrorism4 has
resulted in an uncommon phenomenon for Department of De-
fense ("DOD") Judge Advocates. This group, long dedicated to
selfless service in relative obscurity, now performs, and has had
its past performance reviewed, in the spotlight of public atten-
tion. Exposure has ranged from reports of conflict between uni-
formed and civilian lawyers within the DOD5 amid rumors of
marginalization,6 to the revelation thatjudge advocates had "left
Advocate General's Legal Center and School. In preparing this Article, the Authors
have relied entirely on publicly available sources. Readers should not infer from the
Authors' status in the armed forces reliance on any classified or limited access materials
for production of this Article.
4. We use the phrase Global War on Terrorism ("GWOT") merely to identify collec-
tively a series of ongoing operations following the September 11, 2001 attacks on the
United States. The phrase has generated controversy, especially over the use of the
term "war," which carries special meaning in a number of legal contexts. The U.S.
Constitution, for instance, reserves declarations of war to the Congress. See U.S. CoNsT.
art. I, § 8, cl. 11. The law of war itself reserves application of the majority of its provi-
sions to "declared war" or "armed conflict" between States. See Convention for the Ame-
lioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug.
12, 1949, art. 2, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31, 32 [hereinafter Geneva I]; Convention
for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Mem-
bers of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 2, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85, 86
[hereinafter Geneva II]; Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War,
Aug. 12, 1949, art. 2, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, 136 [hereinafter Geneva III];
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12,
1949, art. 2, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, 288 [hereinafter Geneva IV]. Because
military commissions derive their customary authority and practices from the law of
war, they require war, or at least armed conflict, as a condition precedent to their em-
ployment. See 10 U.S.C. § 821 (2004); see also United States v. Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 27
(1941).
5. See James V. Grimaldi, Army'sJAG Corps Deals With Reality of War in Iraq, WASH.
PosT, Nov. 17, 2003, at El (noting tension following Army General Counsel Steven
Morello's proposal to cut the size of the Army Judge Advocate General ('JAG") Corps
and order that Air Force military lawyers report through civilian Air Force General
Counsel lawyers); see also Dana Priest & R. Jeffrey Smith, Memo Offered Justification for Use
of Torture, WASH. PosT, June 8, 2004, at Al (noting disagreement between Pentagon
civilian and uniformed lawyers over lawfulness of proposed interrogation techniques
for use on detainees).
6. See Iraqi Prisoner Abuse: Hearing Before the Sen. Armed Services Comm., 108th Cong.
(2004) 48-51 (statement of Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.) during testimony of Gen.
Taguba); see also Frontline: Rumsfeld's War: The Inside Story of the War Within the Pentagon
(PBS television broadcast, Oct. 26, 2004), available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/
pages/frontline/shows/pentagon/etc/script.html (expressing the view that, in the
early stages of the GWOT, uniformed lawyers and their advice had been brushed aside
in favor of advice provided by civilian lawyers and political appointees).
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the fold" to contact the New York Bar Association with concerns
over legal positions developing in the Pentagon.
7
The U.S. Congress has taken interest as well, questioning
the ArmyJudge Advocate General and inquiring into the role of
the Staff Judge Advocate advising the ranking commander in
Iraq at the time of the Abu Ghraib detainee abuses.' Congress
has also recently addressed the relationship between military
lawyers and Pentagon leadership.9 Attention, nearly all unsolic-
ited, has focused greatly on a single issue: the status of persons
captured and detained in the operating environments of the
7. See Dana Priest & Dan Morgan, Rumsfeld Defends Rules for Prison; Senators Question
Interrogation Guidelines, WASH. POST, May 13, 2004, at Al (describing unsolicited visits by
eight judge advocates to a senior representative of the New York State Bar Association
to voice concerns over legal opinions rendered by political appointees concerning de-
tainee treatment and interrogation practices).
8. See Iraq Prisoner Abuse: Hearing Before Sen. Armed Services Comm., 108th Cong. 40-
41 (2004) (statement of Col. Marc Warren), available at http://www.washingtonpost.
com/wp-dyn/articles/A39851-2004Mayl9.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2005) [hereinafter
Warren Statement].
9. See Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005,
108th Cong. § 574, 118 Stat. 1811 (2004) (amending 10 U.S.C. §§ 3037, 5046, 5148, and
8037) [hereinafter Reagan NDAA 2005]. The Reagan NDAA 2005 prohibited DOD
personnel from interfering with the ability of a military department JAG and the Staff
Judge Advocate to the Commandant of the Marine Corps to give independent legal
advice to the head of a military department or chief of a military service. See id. It also
prohibited DOD personnel from interfering with the ability ofjudge advocates assigned
to, attached to, or performing duty with military units to give independent legal advice
to commanders. See id. This Section also directs the Secretary of Defense to establish a
study to review the relationship between the legal elements of each of the military de-
partments and to prepare a report recommending desirable statutory, regulatory, and
policy changes to improve the effectiveness of those relationships and to enhance the
legal support provided to the leadership in each military department. See id. In signing
the Ronald Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, President
Bush, made a statement concerning Section 574:
The executive branch shall construe Section 574 in a manner consistent with:
(1) the President's constitutional authorities to take care that the laws be faith-
fully executed, to supervise the unitary executive branch, and as Commander
in Chief; (2) the statutory grant to the Secretary of Defense of authority, direc-
tion, and control over the Department of Defense (10 U.S.C. 113(b)); (3) the
exercise of statutory authority by the Attorney General (28 U.S.C. 512 and
513) and the general counsel of the Department of Defense as its chief legal
officer (10 U.S.C. 140) to render legal opinions that bind all civilian and mili-
tary attorneys within the Department of Defense; and (4) the exercise of au-
thority under the statutes (10 U.S.C. 3019, 5019, and 8019) by which the heads
of the military departments may prescribe the functions of their respective
general counsels.
Press Release, President's Statement on the Ronald Reagan National Defense Authori-
zation Act, 2005 (Oct. 29, 2004), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/re-
leases/2004/10/20041029-6.html.
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Global War on Terrorism, and various practitioners' views
thereof.
The service of U.S. judge advocates dates to July 29, 1775.
Their service is mandated by statute"° and currently 1,494judge
advocates serve in the Army alone. 1 Judge advocates have long
practiced many of the same legal disciplines as their civilian
brethren. More than at any time in our military history, how-
ever, judge advocates focus increasingly on international law,
particularly as it relates to modem military operations. This dis-
cipline, known in military circles as Operational Law, touches on
all legal disciplines, but places special emphasis on legal issues
related directly to war fighting.12 Judge advocates are actively
involved in the development, publication, and review of all ser-
vices' military plans, orders, and doctrine." For example, Army
10. See 10 U.S.C. § 806, art. 6 (2004). Dealing with judge advocates and legal of-
ficers, Article 6 states in relevant part:
(a) The assignment for duty ofjudge advocates of the Army, Navy, Air Force,
and Coast Guard shall be made upon the recommendation of the Judge
Advocate General of the armed force of which they are members. The
assignment for duty ofjudge advocates of the Marine Corps shall be made
by direction of the Commandant of the Marine Corps. The Judge Advo-
cate General or senior members of his staff shall make frequent inspec-
tions in the field in supervision of the administration of military justice.
(b) Convening authorities shall at all times communicate directly with their
staffjudge advocates or legal officers in matters relating to the administra-
tion of military justice; and the staffjudge advocate or legal officer of any
command is entitled to communicate directly with the staff judge advo-
cate or legal officer of a superior or subordinate command, or with the
Judge Advocate General.
Id.
11. See Dep't of the Army, Personnel, Plans, and Training Office, Shaping the
Corps, Forging the Future, Presentation at Fort Knox (Oct. 27, 2004) (on file with au-
thors). The Air Force reports 1,284 active duty judge advocates. See Dep't of the Air
Force, Headquarters Air Force Personnel Ctr., Interactive Demographic Analysis System
Report, at http://www.afpc.randolph.af.mil/sasdemog/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2005).
The Department of the Navy reports 414 active duty marine judge advocates. See Re-
port, Dep't of the Navy, Headquarters Marine Corps, Judge Advocate Support Branch,
Marine Corps Officer Military Occupational Specialty Status Report (Nov. 23, 2004) (on
file with authors).
12. The Army's controlling field manual for legal operations defines "Operational
Law" ("OPLAW") as "that body of domestic, foreign, and international law that directly
affects the conduct of operations." DEP'T OF THE ARMY, FM 27-100, LEGAL SUPPORT TO
OPERATIONS § 3.2 (Mar. 1, 2000) [hereinafter FM 27-100]. OPLAW calls on judge advo-
cates to practice in each of the Army's core legal disciplines including military justice,
international law, administrative law, civil law, claims, and legal assistance. See id. § 3.1.
13. See DEP'T OF DEFENSE, DxREcTE No. 5100.77, DODD LAw OF WAR PROGRAM
§ 5.8.6 (Dec. 9, 1998) [hereinafter DODD 5100.77]. As its title suggests, the DOD Di-
HOSTILE PROTECTED PERSONS
judge advocates, are assigned to all brigade-sized units and de-
ploy with them wherever those units are assigned. 4 At this writ-
ing, more than 200 Army judge advocates are deployed world-
wide;15 the vast majority are in Afghanistan and Iraq, with nota-
ble numbers in Bosnia, Kosovo, South Korea, and other austere
environments.
While judge advocates' roles and functions are by now well
established, the aforementioned public attention has high-
lighted the challenges they face in discharging their duties. To
illustrate these challenges, we will focus on the legal issues that
have arisen regarding persons detained by U.S. armed forces
during the Global War on Terrorism. First, we will review policy-
makers' and commentators' categorization of participants in Op-
eration Enduring Freedom, the armed conflict in Afghanistan
against al Qaeda and Taliban fighters. We will concentrate spe-
cifically on the status of participants operating at the fringes of
the categories of persons protected by the Geneva Conventions.
We will show, for example, how al Qaeda and the Taliban fight-
ers tested the bounds of the Conventions by employing methods
of "warfare" which rendered them non-distinct16 and therefore
rective establishes and assigns responsibilities for the U.S. armed forces' law of war pro-
gram. See id. § 1.1. Among other accomplishments, the directive guaranteesjudge advo-
cate review of all military plans, operations orders, policies, and rules of engagement.
See id. § 5.8.6.
14. In the current Army structure, brigades are composed of between 3,000 and
5,000 soldiers. See Force Structure, SouDERS, Jan. 2004, at 27, available at http://www.
army.mil/soldiers/jan2004/pdfs/forcestructure.pdf. For a discussion of judge advo-
cates' roles in armed conflict, see James E. Baker, LBJ's Ghost: A Contextual Approach to
Targeting Decisions and the Commander in Chief 4 U. CHI. J. INT'L L. 407 (2003); Capt. M.
Scott Holcomb, View From the Frontlines, 4 U. CHI. J. Ir'L L. 561 (2003); Rear Adm.
Michael F. Lohr & Cmdr. Steve Gallotta, Legal Support in War: The Role of Military Law-
yers, 4 U. CHI. J. INT'L L. 465 (2003).
15. See Report, Dep't of the Army, Personnel, Plans, and Training Office,
Deployed Judge Advocate and Paralegal Personnel (Nov. 9, 2004) (on file with au-
thors). Deployed alongside these judge advocates are more than 270 active duty parale-
gals. See id.
16. Scholars, lawyers, and soldiers widely regard distinction as the most fundamen-
tal principle of the law of war. Although long-recognized, the modern expression of
the principle is found in Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions. Titled the "Basic rule,"
Article 48 requires that belligerents "at all times distinguish between the civilian popula-
tion and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives.. . ." Protocol
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protec-
tion of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, art. 48, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3,
25 [hereinafter Protocol I]. Although the United States is not a party to Protocol I, it
regards many of its provisions, including Article 48, to be reflective of customary inter-
national law and therefore binding on its armed forces. See Michael J. Matheson, Session
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made a determination of their status unclear. We will demon-
strate how policymakers and ultimately the U.S. President cre-
ated a class of persons - so-called extra-conventional persons -
who participated in hostilities yet failed to qualify for protection
under any of the applicable Geneva Conventions.
Second, we will present the training and education available
to the judge advocates who faced these legal issues. We further
present perspectives on the law of war as it appeared from the
resources, education, and training commonly available to
deployed judge advocates. We ultimately conclude that interna-
tional law and U.S. military doctrine classify many who partici-
pate in hostilities as "protected persons" " under the Fourth Ge-
neva Convention - a concept ultimately at odds with the deter-
mination made by U.S. policymakers.
We employ the term "hostile protected persons" to distin-
guish participants from the broader categories of "protected per-
sons" as well as from "unlawful combatants." This is not to say
that the Authors or those judge advocates serving with deployed
forces reject flatly or dismiss the categorization of those partici-
pants as "unlawful combatants" or extra-conventional persons.
Indeed, we admit that a colorable argument may be and was ad-
vanced for that proposition. We argue, however, that the state of
international law, particularly as it is advanced in the relevant
Department of the Army Field Manual, leads us, and led other
uniformed attorneys, to the conclusion that it was appropriate to
label such participants "protected persons."
Third, and in concert with the two issues identified above,
we will describe the enormous challenges these issues created for
U.S. military persons participating in Operation Iraqi Freedom.
One: The United States Position on the Relation of Customary International Law to the 1977
Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Convention, 2 Am. U. J. INr'L L. & POL'Y 419, 425
(1987).
17. Article 4 of the Fourth Geneva Convention defines "protected persons" as
"those who, at a given moment and in any manner whatsoever, find themselves, in case
of a conflict or occupation, in the hands of a Party to the conflict or Occupying Power
of which they are not nationals." Geneva IV, supra note 4, art. 4. Article 4 does not
cover nationals of States not bound by the Conventions, nationals of neutral States in
the territory of one of the belligerent States, or persons covered by the First, Second, or
Third Geneva Conventions. See id. Notably, unlawful combatants are not mentioned
among those excluded from coverage. See id. For a detailed explanation of "protected
persons" under the Fourth Geneva Convention, see infra text accompanying notes 192-
196.
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Specifically, we will illustrate operational and legal challenges
faced by military attorneys and the commanders they advised.
We will then explore legal issues that arose during the detention
and occupation operations with respect to fighters associated
with Saddam Fedayeen.18 Observing apparent similarities be-
tween Saddam Fedayeen and Taliban fighters earlier categorized
as extra-conventional, we will describe how, despite similarities
in applicable law and attributes, judge advocates determined
that these irregular fighters were protected persons under the
Fourth Geneva Convention. We conclude that judge advocates
dealt with these challenges responsibly, providing sound legal
advice that balanced commanders' mission requirements with
the humanitarian spirit of the law of war.
I. EXISTING POLICY AND SCHOLARSHIP ON UNLAWFUL
COMBATANTS' STATUS UNDER THE LAW OF WAR
In order to consider the ultimate policy determinations con-
cerning the status of participants in Operation Iraqi Freedom,
we will look first to Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan
and examine the status ascribed by policymakers to the partici-
pants in that conflict. For our purposes, relevant operational ac-
tivity began in early October 2001, when U.S. Special Forces in
Afghanistan, operating with Afghan Northern Alliance forces,
began rounding up large numbers of Taliban fighters and other
persons participating in hostilities.19 From the release of inter-
agency legal documents contemporaneous to operations in Af-
18. Originally a paramilitary organization led by Saddam Hussein's son Uday, the
Saddam Fedayeen (translated as "Men of Sacrifice") evolved into a brutal, domestic unit
of regime enforcers. See GlobalSecurity.org, Saddam's Martyrs ["Men of Sacifice"]:
Fedayeen Saddam, at http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/world/iraq/fedayeen.htm
(last visited Feb. 12, 2005). The unit, totaling between 18,000 and 40,000 members,
reported directly to the Presidential Palace for its orders. See id. Following the U.S.
invasion of Iraq in 2003, U.S. commanders attributed irregular attacks on U.S. troops to
Saddam Fedayeen militias. See Steven Lee Meyers, In the Field; Third Infantry Division: Dis-
covering Doubt and Death on Drive Toward Baghdad, N.Y. TiMFs, Apr. 13, 2003, at Al. After
the declared end of major combat operations in May 2003, U.S. commanders traced
persistent insurgent-style attacks on U.S. troops and facilities to former Saddam
Fedayeen. See Douglas Jehl, U.S. Forces Girding for Raids by Iraqis, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2003,
at Al.
19. See Michael R. Gordon, Special Forces Hunt Al Qaeda on the Ground, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 15, 2001, at Al (reporting on the more than 100 U.S. special forces operating in
Afghanistan and the use of road blocks to capture Taliban and al Qaeda commanders);
see also David Rohde, Shadouy U.S. Militay Presence in an Afghan Town, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
9, 2001, at B3 (discussing the first public reports of U.S. Army Special Forces operating
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ghanistan, it is clear that the issue of these detainees' status
under the law of war was raised early in the conflict and ad-
dressed at the highest levels of government. Policymakers were
apparently asked to address the question of the status of Taliban
and al Qaeda detainees' because of intense interest in their intel-
ligence value and the uncertainties raised by the nature of the
war on terrorism.
Specifically, lawyers for the DOD, Department of Justice
("DOJ"), and Department of State ("DOS"), as well as White
House Counsel, considered whether al Qaeda and Taliban fight-
ers seized in Afghanistan qualified for protection under the 1949
Geneva Conventions.20  Ultimately, many of these documents
laid the foundations for future legal analysis of related, and
frankly unrelated, questions of detainee status in subsequent the-
aters of combat.
The groundwork for the executive branch determinations
concerning al Qaeda and Taliban status was laid in a series of
memoranda beginning in January 2002.21 These opinions ap-
pear to have been part of an interagency, iterative process to
form an administration policy concerning the United States' ob-
ligations under the Geneva Conventions. Interestingly, and per-
haps troubling to those who had conducted the operation, the
majority of these opinions were not produced, much less re-
leased, until well after major combat operations had diminished
in Afghanistan.22 Analysis in all three DOJ memoranda focused
on the issue of policymakers' and commanders' potential expo-
sure to prosecution under the War Crimes Act ("the Act") 23 for
with Northern Alliance forces to coordinate attacks and guide U.S. air strikes on
Taliban and al Qaeda targets).
20. See discussion infra pt. II.A. In addition to addressing the applicability of the
Geneva Conventions, the legal opinions and memoranda associated with the issue of al
Qaeda and Taliban status also addressed issues associated with domestic legislation such
as the War Crimes Act. See Memorandum from John C. Yoo & Robert Delahunty to
William J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel to the DOD, Application of Treaties and Laws to al
Qaeda and Taliban Detainees 3-6 (Dec. 28, 2001), available at http://www.msnbc.msn.
com/id/5025040/site/newsweek. We will limit our discussion and analysis of these
memoranda to points raised under relevant international law.
21. See infra notes 26-30 and accompanying text.
22. See, e.g., infra note 26 and accompanying text.
23. See 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (2004). The Act incorporates violations of the law of war
into the U.S. criminal code. Among these are "grave breaches" of the 1949 Geneva
Conventions and violations of humane treatment standards listed in Common Article 3
of the four Geneva Conventions. See id. For a discussion of the memoranda addressing
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treatment of detainees and conduct of hostilities. The threshold
issue of application of the Act depended greatly on determina-
tions of whether the Third Geneva Convention of 1949 applied,
as a matter of law, to the conflict in Afghanistan and whether
enemy fighters seized in that campaign qualified for protection
as prisoners of war.24
A. Department of Justice Analysis
The first, and arguably most influential, 2 of the above-men-
tioned DOJ opinions, dated January 22, 2002, was entitled "Ap-
plication of Treaties and Laws to al Qaeda and Taliban Detain-
ees."26 It made three main points, beginning with the status of al
Qaeda under international law. The authors immediately em-
phasized that al Qaeda was not a State actor and as such, could
not be a Party to the Geneva Conventions or other international
treaties. 2' Al Qaeda members, the memorandum noted, were
part of a "non-governmental terrorist organization, " 2 ' and there-
fore could not avail themselves of the Geneva Conventions' pro-
tections as the Conventions were not applicable to the conflict.29
The memorandum further urged that because al Qaeda was a
non-State actor and its members were mere criminals, there did
applicability of the War Crimes Act and Geneva Conventions to U.S. operations in the
war on terror, see infra note 75 and accompanying text.
24. See infta note 58 and accompanying text.
25. President Bush indicated that he relied heavily upon the January 22 Memoran-
dum in his ultimate determinations concerning application of the law of war to opera-
tions associated with the GWOT and status of al Qaeda and Taliban fighters detained in
Afghanistan and elsewhere. See Memorandum from President of the United States to
Vice President, et al., Humane Treatment of al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees (Feb. 7,
2002), available at http://www2.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB127/02.02.07.
pdf [hereinafter President Bush Memo]; see also infra text accompanying notes 82-90.
26. Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att'y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel,
Dep't of Justice, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, and William J.
Haynes II, Gen. Counsel of the DOD, Application of Treaties and Laws to al Qaeda and
Taliban Detainees (Jan. 22, 2002), available at http://washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/na-
tion/documents/012202bybee.pdf [hereinafter Bybee Memo]. Recently, a portion of a
January 9, 2002 Memorandum addressing the same issues was made available to the
public. See Memorandum from John Yoo & Robert Delahunty to William J. Haynes II,
Application of Treaties and Laws to al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees (Jan. 9, 2002),
available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/5025040/site/newsweek/. This memoran-
dum appears to be a draft of the January 22, 2002 Memorandum later staffed to the
DOD. See id.
27. See Bybee Memo, supra note 26, at 9.
28. Id.
29. See id.
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not exist a state of international armed conflict between the
United States and al Qaeda sufficient to trigger the laws of
armed conflict, including the protections of the Third Geneva
Convention.3 °
Ordinarily, the threshold determination that the Conven-
tions did not regulate U.S. armed forces' interactions with al
Qaeda would preclude the need for further analysis of its mem-
bers under the Conventions. The memorandum, nonetheless,
next considered whether al Qaeda members would qualify
under the Third Geneva Convention's Prisoner of War ("POW")
qualification criteria.
30. See id. at 9-10.
31. Article 4 of the Third Geneva Convention states in relevant part:
A. Prisoners of war, in the sense of the present Convention, are persons be-
longing to one of the following categories, who have fallen into the power
of the enemy:
(1) Members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict, as well as mem-
bers of militias or volunteer corps forming part of such armed forces.
(2) Members of other militias and members of other volunteer corps, in-
cluding those of organized resistance movements, belonging to a Party
to the conflict and operating in or outside their own territory, even if
this territory is occupied, provided that such militias or volunteer
corps, including such organized resistance movements, fulfill the fol-
lowing conditions:
(a) that of being commanded by a person responsible for his subordi-
nates;
(b) that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance;
(c) that of carrying arms openly;
(d) that of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws
and customs of war.
(3) Members of regular armed forces who profess allegiance to a govern-
ment or an authority not recognized by the Detaining Power.
(4) Persons who accompany the armed forces without actually being mem-
bers thereof, such as civilian members of military aircraft crews, war
correspondents, supply contractors, members of labour units or of ser-
vices responsible for the welfare of the armed forces, provided that
they have received authorization, from the armed forces which they
accompany, who shall provide them for that purpose with an identity
card similar to the annexed model.
(5) Members of crews, including masters, pilots and apprentices, of the
merchant marine and the crews of civil aircraft of the Parties to the
conflict, who do not benefit by more favourable treatment under any
other provisions of international law.
(6) Inhabitants of a non-occupied territory, who on the approach of the
enemy spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading forces, with-
out having had time to form themselves into regular armed units, pro-
vided they carry arms openly and respect the laws and customs of war.
Geneva Ill, supra note 4, art. 4.
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In an apparent abundance of caution, the memorandum
anticipated arguments that al Qaeda fighters might merit POW
status under provisions reserved for non-traditional armed forces
such as Articles 4(A) (2) and 4(A) (3) of the Third Geneva Con-
vention.32
DOJ lawyers rejected these positions on three bases. First,
they concluded that the Article 4 criteria did not operate inde-
pendently of the Geneva Conventions' general State Party re-
quirement. Article 4, they asserted, had no application indepen-
dent of the Conventions' triggering mechanism in Article 2.
They stated that Article 4 "cannot be read as an alternative, and
a far more expansive, statement of the application of the Con-
vention. It merely specifies, where there is a conflict covered by
Article 2 of the Convention, who must be accorded POW sta-
tus. ' 33 Second, the memorandum quickly concluded that as a
group,34 al Qaeda failed to fulfill the four conditions required
for militia to qualify for POW status under the Third Geneva
32. See Bybee Memo, supra note 26, at 9.
33. Id. at 9-10.
34. The Bybee Memorandum and subsequent Department ofJustice ("DOJ") legal
opinions that have applied the four criteria of Article 4(A) (2) of the Third Geneva
Convention raise an issue frequently discussed by judge advocates at the Army Judge
Advocate General's School. That is, should the four criteria that militia must satisfy to
attain prisoner of war ("POW") status be applied to groups of militia, or are they in-
tended to be part an individualized inquiry, applied separately to each detainee? See
Geneva III, supra note 4, art. 5 (providing for tribunals to be conducted to determine
whether detainees merit POW status in cases of doubt). Clearly, DOJ and ultimately the
President, applied the criteria to al Qaeda and, more importantly, the Taliban as
groups. See Bybee Memo, supra note 26, at 10, 30-31. Although the Bybee memoran-
dum ultimately declined to advise whether the Taliban had satisfied the 4(A) (2) criteria
(citing lack of evidence of battlefield conduct), the memorandum clearly anticipated
conducting such an inquiry on a group basis once facts were available. See id.; see also
YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL
ARMED CONFLICT 33-44 (2004) (addressing the POW qualification criteria in a recent
text on jus in bello). Professor Dinstein first identifies seven, as opposed to the tradi-
tional four, cumulative criteria. See id. at 37-41. His additional criteria include organi-
zation in the form of embedded discipline, belonging to a Party to the conflict, and
non-allegiance to the detaining power. See id. at 39-41. Considering their application,
Professor Dinstein ponders whether his seven are criteria intended to be applied
against individuals or instead against groups of which such individuals are members. See
id. at 43. He concludes that criteria related to organization such as the first of the
Article 4(A) (2) criteria and his own criteria of embedded discipline and belonging to a
Party to the conflict are inquires that may only be directed against a group. That is,
individuals cannot of their own accord develop organization or the international legal
status of "party." See id. Dinstein explains, however, that the requirement of non-alle-
giance to the captor can only operate under an individualized inquiry. See id. He con-
cludes that the remaining criteria - insignia, carrying arms openly, and adherence to
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Convention. 5 Third, DOJ determined that al Qaeda members
did not qualify under Article 4(A) (3), which grants POW status
to "members of regular armed forces who profess allegiance to a
government or an authority not recognized by the Detaining
Power."3 6 Revealing an argument later used to deny POW status
to Taliban fighters, DOJ lawyers contended that the "members of
regular armed forces" referred to in Article 4(A) (3) must none-
theless comply with the four POW eligibility criteria articulated
in Article 4(A) (2) .3 Accordingly, the memorandum concluded
that al Qaeda did not qualify under 4(A) (3) or any other provi-
sion of the Third Geneva Convention for protection as prisoners
of war.
The January 22, 2002 DOJ Memorandum next considered
the scope of protections under Common Article 3 of the Con-
ventions. 38 Common Article 3, so called for its identical appear-
ance in all four Geneva Conventions, provides a set of protec-
tions applicable to "armed conflict not of an international char-
acter. '3 9 DOJ lawyers addressed arguments that the protections
of Common Article 3, essentially a recital of fundamental mini-
mums of humane and just treatment, covered al Qaeda mem-
bers because their conflict with the United States did not rise to
the level of an international armed conflict.40 Adopting a strict,
though historically supported, reading of Common Article 3, the
memorandum rejected application of Common Article 3 to the
conflict with al Qaeda.4 DOJ lawyers reasoned that although
the conflict with al Qaeda was not international in the sense that
it was not between two State Parties, it was international in its
scope and the nationalities of participants. 4 2 In fact, the memo-
randum labeled hostilities between the United States and al
Qaeda "a conflict 'of an international character"'43 - a label, in
fact, consistent with the administration's slogan for the conflict,
the law of war - are hybrids: they may be tested on an individual basis, but group
behavior may be substituted for specific information of the individual. See id.
35. See Bybee Memo, supra note 26, at 10.
36. Geneva III, supra note 4, art. 4(A)(3).
37. See infra note 82 and accompanying text.
38. See Bybee Memo, supra note 26, at 5-9.
39. Geneva III, supra note 4, art. 3.





the Global War on Terrorism. Common Article 3, the memoran-
dum argued, was originally drafted to cover only "civil wars" re-
stricted to the territory of a single Party to the Conventions."
The memorandum went so far as to deny Common Article 3 cov-
erage to civil wars with transnational aspects such as those involv-
ing insurgencies based in or operating from other States.4" State
practice and the drafting history of the Conventions, the memo-
randum argued, supported a limited application of Common Ar-
ticle 3 to conflicts occurring strictly within the borders of a single
Party to the Conventions.46
Turning to the Taliban, the January 22, 2002 DOJ Memo-
randum admitted a thornier issue was at stake.4 7 The Memoran-
dum conceded that Afghanistan was a long-standing Party to the
Geneva Conventions and the Conventions might arguably apply
to U.S. operations against the Taliban militia as the de facto
armed forces of Afghanistan.4" Rejection of this position fo-
cused on Afghanistan's status as a non-functioning or failed
State. The Memorandum noted that since displacing the pre-
ceding regime, the Taliban had not fully controlled the territory
of Afghanistan,49 failed to perform normal governmental func-
tions,' ° was not capable of conducting inter-governmental rela-
tions with other States," and had not achieved significant recog-
nition within the international community.5 2
Considering the issue first under domestic law, DOJ lawyers
found a strong case for suspending the application of the Con-
ventions to the failed State of Afghanistan. The Memorandum
argued that the U.S. President's constitutional authority to make
treaties included an inherent power "to suspend treaty obliga-
tions because of a fundamental change in circumstances."53
44. See id. at 6.
45. See id.
46. See id.
47. See id. at 10 ("Whether the Geneva Conventions apply to the detention and
trial of members of the Taliban militia presents a more difficult legal question.").
48. See id. at 10-11, 15-20.
49. See id. at 16.
50. See id. at 17 (citing LARRY P. GOODSON, AFGHANISTAN'S ENDLESS WAR: STATE
FAILURE, REGIONAL POLITICS, AND THE RISE OF THE TALBAN 103-04, 115 (2001); see also
AHMED RASHID, TALIBAN: MILITANT ISLAM, OIL & FUNDAMENTALISM IN CENTRAL ASIA 207-
08, 212-13 (2001)).
51. See id. at 18.
52. See id. at 20.
53. Id. at 13 (citing, as an example, President Franklin D. Roosevelt's 1939 suspen-
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As a matter of international law, however, DOJ lawyers con-
ceded a closer question. While States had been permitted to ter-
minate or withdraw from treaties in the face of breaches, the
memorandum acknowledged special rules and practice with re-
spect to humanitarian treaties.5 4 Humanitarian treaties, like the
Geneva Conventions, the Memorandum noted, represented
State obligations not dependent on reciprocal observance and
practice.5 5 Such practices notwithstanding, and citing dissatisfac-
tion and inadequacy of traditional remedies for material
breaches of the law of war, DOJ lawyers deduced a right to sus-
pend the Conventions when faced with "widespread violations
... by others. 56
Perhaps anticipating that the President might decline to sus-
pend the Conventions, and almost certainly forecasting inter-
agency disagreement over suspension of the Conventions, the
memorandum addressed the Taliban fighters' status under the
Third Geneva Convention. Admitting that the classification pro-
visions of Article 4 of the Third Geneva Convention seemed to
contemplate "a case-by-case determination of an individual's sta-
tus," the Memorandum nonetheless asserted that the President
was empowered to process Taliban members as a group and to
categorically deny them POW status. Such a determination,
the DOJ argued, would eliminate the "doubt" prerequisite to
prisoner classification tribunals convened under Article 5 of the
Third Geneva Convention.58 The Memorandum declined to ad-
sion of the London Naval Treaty of 1936 in response to like suspension by other Parties
and conditions of impossibility).
54. See Bybee Memo, supra note 26, at 23; see also Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 60(5), 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (noting that provisions contained
in Article 60 permitting States to terminate or suspend treaties materially breached by
other parties are not applicable to "treaties of a humanitarian character.")
55. See Bybee Memo, supra note 26, at 23-24 (citing G.I.A.D. DRAPER, THE RED
CROSS CONVENTIONS 8 (1958)).
56. Id. at 24-25.
57. See id. at 30.
58. Article 5 of the Third Geneva Convention states that:
The present Convention shall apply to the persons referred to in Article 4
from the time they fall into the power of the enemy and until their final re-
lease and repatriation.
Should any doubt arise as to whether persons, having committed a belligerent
act and having fallen into the hands of the enemy, belong to any of the catego-
ries enumerated in Article 4, such persons shall enjoy the protection of the
present Convention until such time as their status has been determined by a
competent tribunal.
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vise the White House on Taliban fighters' prospects under the
Article 4(A) (2) criteria explicitly applicable to militias, citing in-
adequate information concerning the Taliban's organization,
conduct and appearance.59
Finally, the DOJ considered the possible application of cus-
tomary international law to treatment of al Qaeda and Taliban
detainees.6 ° Noting a longstanding debate over the status of cus-
tomary international law under the Constitution and among the
laws of the land, the authors concluded that customary interna-
tional law was not true federal law and did not, therefore, bind
the executive. 6' The Memorandum added that customary inter-
national law, formed merely through the practice of States and a
sense of legal obligation, did not undergo the formalities re-
quired of federal law. Absent such required process as legislative
approval and executive signature, 'customary international law
could at best only operate as general federal common law that
did not bind the executive.6 2 Citing the grave danger of interfer-
ence with the President's powers as Commander in Chief, the
memorandum asserted that no customary international law
could limit the President, or for that matter the U.S. Armed
Forces, in their treatment of al Qaeda or Taliban detainees.63
In summary, the DOJ January 22 Memorandum offered a
highly flexible approach to the treatment of al Qaeda and
Taliban detainees. The entire conflict with al Qaeda members,
wherever fought, was determined to be outside the scope of the
Geneva Conventions, while the Taliban's protections were ar-
Geneva III, supra note 4, art. 5 (emphasis added).
59. See Bybee Memo, supra note 26, at 31.
60. Substantial portions of the law of war have achieved the status of customary
international law. See Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribu-
nal (1945-1946), reprinted in 2 THE LAw OF WAR: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 922, 960-61
(Leon Friedman ed., 1972) (recognizing the rules of land warfare expressed in the
Hague Convention as customary international law). See generallyJEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS
& LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, 1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAw (2005)
(representing a nearly ten-year, three-volume effort by the International Committee of
the Red Cross to identify provisions of the law of war that have achieved customary
international law status); Theodor Meron, The Geneva Conventions as Customary Interna-
tional Law, 81 AM.J. INT'L L. 348 (1987).
61. See Bybee Memo, supra note 26, at 33-34.
62. See id. at 34.
63. See id. at 35-36 ("[A] llowing the federal courts to rely upon international law to
restrict the President's discretion to conduct war would raise deep structural problems
[and] relying on customary international law here would undermine the President's
control over foreign relations and his Commander in Chief authority.").
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gued to be subject to suspension or at least categorically, and
summarily, to be denied by the President. Customary interna-
tional law would not operate in any binding sense as a legal limi-
tation on the executive, although its provisions might continue
to operate on the armed forces absent guidance to the contrary
from the executive.
B. State Department Commentary
That the conclusions drawn by the DOJ were not shared
among all agencies of the executive is made apparent by DOS
memoranda made publicly available in the summer of 2004.
Two memoranda, one from the Secretary of State, Colin Pow-
ell,6 4 and a second from the DOS Legal Advisor, William Howard
Taft, IV,65 apparently sought to provide counterpoints and alter-
natives to the January 22 DOJ memorandum and the White
House Counsel memorandum. The authors styled each memo-
randum as a response to a DOJ or White House Counsel position
intended to inform the President's decision.
The first, Secretary Powell's memorandum, by its subject
line, indicated that the DOS received a draft decision memoran-
dum for the President, dated January 25, 2002, in advance of his
determination of al Qaeda and Taliban status. The decision
memorandum, from White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales, in-
dicated that the President had made some initial determinations
on these matters on January 18, 2002, but that the Secretary of
State had subsequently offered contrary advice and requested re-
consideration.6 6 Secretary Powell's January 26 memorandum
identified two options available to the President and discussed
the merits and costs of each.
The Memorandum considered first the advantages and dis-
advantages of determining that the Conventions did not apply to
64. See Memorandum from Secretary of State Colin Powell, to Counsel to the Presi-
dent, Draft Decision Memorandum on the Applicability of the Geneva Convention to
the Conflict in Afghanistan (Jan. 26, 2002), available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/
id/4999363/site/newsweek/ [hereinafter Powell Memo].
65. See Memorandum from William H. Taft, IV, to Counsel to the President, Com-
ments on Your Paper on the Geneva Convention (Feb. 2, 2002), available at http://
www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/taft.pdf [hereinafter Taft Memo].
66. See Memorandum from Alberto Gonzales, White House Counsel, to President
of the United States, Decision Re Application of the Geneva Convention on Prisoners
of War to the Conflict with Al Qaeda and the Taliban (Jan. 25, 2002), available at http:/
/msnbc.msn.com/id/4999148/site/newsweek/ [hereinafter Gonzales Taliban Memo].
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the conflict with al Qaeda and the Taliban under the theories
offered by the DOJ memo. Among other advantages identified
as common to both options, the Memorandum noted that de-
clining to apply or suspending the Conventions altogether of-
fered the administration maximum flexibility and minimum am-
biguity. The Memorandum further observed that the first op-
tion would avoid the burden associated with individual case-by-
case determinations of status under the Conventions.67 The
memorandum then identified a number of disadvantages that
would result from not applying the Conventions: (1) a reversal
in a longstanding U.S. policy of liberal application of the Con-
ventions; (2) a negative international reaction, even among al-
lies; (3) a hindrance of future efforts at terrorist suspect extradi-
tion; and (4) increased exposure to domestic and international
legal challenges.6" Importantly, the Memorandum noted that
the Geneva Conventions offered a "more flexible and suitable
legal framework" than alternative legal structures such as human
rights law - an argument frequently made in favor of the law of
war as the law of choice for regulating conduct in hostilities.69
The Memorandum then addressed a second option far
more favorably: applying the Geneva Conventions to the con-
flict in Afghanistan generally, and making individual determina-
tions concerning detainees' POW status. Secretary Powell ar-
gued that this option would have several advantages: (1) it would
offer flexibility comparable to that of the first option; (2) it
would preserve U.S. credibility and moral authority for future
actions in the Global War on Terrorism; and (3) importantly, it
would place the United States in a position to insist on the pro-
tection of its own armed forces under the Geneva Conventions
in all operations." The Memorandum conceded that, if tribu-
nals were conducted to determine individuals' status under the
Third Geneva Convention, some al Qaeda members might qual-
ify for POW status. Powell.added, however, that such findings
67. See supra text accompanying note 58.
68. See Powell Memo, supra note 64, at 2-3.
69. Powell Memo, supra note 64, at 3. See Advisory Opinion, Legality of the Threat
or Use of Nuclear Weapons, [1996] I.C.J. 95, 25, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/
icjwww/idecisions/isummaries/iunanaummary960708.htm (last visited Mar. 8, 2005)
(discussing the human rights/law of war debate, and law of war as lex specialis).
70. See Powell Memo, supra note 64, at 3-4; see also infra notes 163, 165-166 and
accompanying text (addressing the U.S. reversal of decisions not to apply Geneva Con-
ventions in the Syrian shoot down and Macedonian capture incidents).
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would not affect their treatment significantly.7" This opinion
was likely founded on the DOD practice of treating all detainees
in accordance with the principles of the Third Geneva Conven-
72tion.
An attachment to Secretary Powell's memorandum also an-
nounced disagreement with legal and factual matters asserted by
the White House Counsel. The attachment found error and in-
consistency in the finding that Afghanistan was a failed State and
predicted international dissent over the finding that the Presi-
dent could suspend the Geneva Conventions. The attachment
further purported to correct the assertion that the United States
had declined to apply Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conven-
tions to the 1989 conflict in Panama. 73 Finally, the attachment
asserted, again, in apparent contravention of the decision mem-
orandum, that the United States had never determined that the
Third Geneva Convention did not apply to an armed conflict in
which U.S. troops were engaged. 4
The second DOS Memorandum, dated February 2, 2002,
from Ambassador Taft, reemphasized many points raised in Sec-
71. See Powell Memo, supra note 64, at 4.
72. See DEP'T OF THE ARaMy, REG. 190-8, 1 1-(5) (a) (1)-(2) (Oct. 1, 1997) [hereinaf-
ter AR 190-8]; see also DODD 5100.77, supra note 13, 5.3.1. At the time of this writing,
Army Regulation 190-8 was under review by the U.S. Department of the Army, pursuant
to determinations to assess the Department's internment, enemy POW, and detention
policies, practices and procedures. See Memorandum from Acting Secretary of the
Army, R. L. Brownlee, to Department of the Army Inspector General, Directive for As-
sessment of Detainee Operations (Feb. 10, 2004), in DEP'T OF THE ARMy, THE INSPEc'rOR
GENERAL, DETAINEE OPERATIONS INSPECTION (Jul. 21, 2004), available at http://www.
globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2004/daig-detainee-ops-2Ijul2OO4.pdf.
The Department of the Army is the DOD Executive Agent for POW matters. See id.
73. See Comments on the Memorandum of January 25, 2002, attached to Powell
Memo, supra note 64; see also infta note 162 and accompanying text.
74. See Powell Memo, supra note 64, at 5. The January 25, 2002 decision memoran-
dum stated in relevant part:
The argument that the U.S. has never determined that [the Geneva Conven-
tion III on the Treatment of Prisoners of War ("]GPW[")] did not apply is
incorrect. In at least one case (Panama in 1989) the U.S. determined that
GPW did not apply even though it determined for policy reasons to adhere to
the convention. More importantly, as noted above, this is a new type of war-
fare - one not contemplated in 1949 when the GPW was framed - and re-
quires a new approach in our actions towards captured terrorists. Indeed, as
the statement quoted from the administration of President George Bush
makes clear, the U.S. will apply GPW "whenever hostilities occur with regular
foreign armed forces."
Gonzales Taliban Memo, supra note 66, at 3.
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retary Powell's Memorandum. Taft's Memorandum expanded,
however, the general DOS position concerning the conflict with
Afghanistan.7 5 The Memorandum derided attempts to bifurcate
the conflict into one with al Qaeda and another with the
Taliban.76 Such a distinction, the Memorandum argued, was
contrary to the structure of the Conventions.77 Ambassador Taft
argued that the Conventions were essentially an "all or nothing"
proposition with respect to armed conflict.7 8 Either the Conven-
tions apply to a conflict, and all its participants fall under its pro-
visions, or they do not apply, and no one involved can enjoy
their protections or benefits.79 Taft argued that determining
that the Conventions applied to the conflict in Afghanistan
would be consistent with years of U.S. policy, as well as with the
views of "every other party to the Conventions," and U.N. Secur-
ity Council Resolution 1193.80
In sum, the DOS offered a conflicting view of the Presi-
dent's obligations under international law. In addition to insist-
ing on a more traditional and liberal application of the Conven-
tions to armed conflict generally, the DOS offered a reading of
the Third Geneva Convention's POW qualifications that sug-
gested individual, case-by-case inquiries were appropriate to clas-
sify detainees captured in Afghanistan.
75. See Taft Memo, supra note 65. Ambassador Taft's memorandum may also have
been a response to a short letter Attorney General Ashcroft wrote to the President on
February 1, 2002, arguing in favor of a Presidential determination that the Third Ge-
neva Convention did not apply to the conflict in Afghanistan. See Letter from Attorney
General John Ashcroft, to President of the United States (Feb. 1, 2002), available at
http://www2.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB127/020201.pdf [hereinafter Ash-
croft Letter]. The Ashcroft Letter cited minimizing exposure to prosecution under the
States War Crimes Act of 1996 as the most important reason to decline to apply the
Conventions. See id. at 1 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (2004)).
76. See Taft Memo, supra note 65, at 2.
77. See id.
78. See id.
79. See Taft Memo, supra note 65, at 2.
80. See id. at 1. The U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1193 on August 28,
1998. See S.C. Res. 1193, U.N. SCOR, 52d sess., 391st mtg., at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/l193
(1998). Without invoking its powers under Chapters VI or VII of the U.N. Charter, the
Council expressed a number of demands upon the Parties to the conflict in Taliban-
controlled Afghanistan, including "foreign military personnel." Id. The Council af-
firmed that "all [P]arties to the conflict are bound to comply with their obligations
under international humanitarian law and in particular the Geneva Conventions of 12
August 1949." Id. at 3, 12.
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C. Presidential Determinations of February 7, 2002
The White House Counsel appeared to have had the last
word in the debate, memorialized in a February 7, 2002 memo-
randum to the President. With factual information and details
on the Taliban's battlefield conduct and appearance available,8 '
the White House Counsel offered a detailed analysis of the
Taliban under the Third Geneva Convention's POW qualifica-
tion criteria. The Taliban were found to lack three of the four
necessary cumulative characteristics that give militia POW pro-
tection. 2 As such, the White House Counsel concluded, should
the President decide to apply the Conventions to the conflict in
Afghanistan, the Taliban would nonetheless be excluded from
protection.83
Presented with the options and advice put forth in the DOJ,
DOS, and White House Counsel memoranda, the President is-
sued a memorandum on February 7, 2002, outlining the admin-
istration's ultimate position on the application and operation of
the Geneva Conventions relative to the conflict in Afghanistan.8 4
81. Recall that the DOJ January 22 Memorandum had declined to analyze the
Taliban under Article 4 (A) (2) of the Third Geneva Convention as detailed information
on their techniques, tactics and procedures was not available at the time. See Bybee
Memo, supra note 26; see also supra text accompanying note 59.
82. See President Bush Memo, supra note 25, at 2; see also Bybee Memo, supra note
26, at 9-10 (explaining that based on DOD information, Taliban fighters did not qualify
for POW status under any of the categories established by Article 4 of the Third Geneva
Convention). Bybee's analysis found that the Taliban did not qualify as militia under
Article 4(A) (2) because it failed to adhere to the four enumerated requirements. See
Bybee Memo, supra note 26, at 10 (explaining article 4(A) (2) requirement that militia
or volunteer fighters fulfill four requirements: (1) command by responsible individu-
als; (2) wearing insignia; (3) carrying arms openly; and (4) obeying the Laws of war).
See id. Bybee next addressed the possibility that the Taliban qualified as the armed
force of a Party to the Conventions under either Article 4(A)(1) or Article 4(A)(3). See
id. (dismissing the possibility that the Taliban could actually be the armed forces of the
State of Afghanistan and therefore automatically entitled to POW protections, and not-
ing that the Article 4(A) (2) criteria for militia were derived from attributes long associ-
ated with, and expected of, regular armed forces). The Memorandum noted the ap-
pearance of these criteria in the 1907 Hague Regulations. See id. Simply stated, the
Taliban were not the armed forces of the legitimate government of Afghanistan. See id.
Thus, the memorandum concluded that a group serving as the armed force of a legiti-
mate government would not be entitled to protections such as combatant immunity if it
failed to meet the same kind of requirements (wearing uniforms, carrying arms openly,
etc.) that applied to militias. See id.
83. See Bybee Memo, supra note 26 at 37.
84. See President Bush Memo, supra note 25. From memoranda immediately pre-
ceding the President's Memorandum, as well as from a recently unclassified January 19,
2002 memorandum from the Secretary of Defense to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
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The points that the President's memorandum addressed are dis-
cussed below.
Citing the DOJ January 22 Memorandum 85 and Attorney
General Ashcroft's letter of February 1,86 for support, the Presi-
dent determined that the Geneva Conventions did not apply to
the conflict with al Qaeda, as they were not a "High Contracting
Party" to the treaty.8 7 Rejecting the DOS argument that the Con-
ventions must apply in total or not at all to a conflict, the Presi-
dent isolated for separate treatment the conflict with al Qaeda
from the fight against the State of Afghanistan. The President
noted that this determination would persist in all U.S. opera-
tions against al Qaeda in the future, no matter where con-
ducted.88
The President also accepted the DOJ opinion concerning
his authority to suspend the Geneva Conventions with respect to
Afghanistan.89 He declined, however, to exercise that authority.
Reserving the right to do so in the future, and in an apparent
change of course,9" the President determined that the Conven-
tions would apply to the conflict with the Taliban in Afghani-
stan.91 Because, however, the Taliban did not meet the criteria
of Article 4, Paragraph (a) (2) of the Third Geneva Convention
(they neither carried arms openly, nor complied with the law of
war, and failed to wear distinctive insignia), he found them to be
unlawful combatants not entitled to POW status.92 Hence, the
President could assert that although he applied the full measure
of Staff, it appears that the President made determinations prior to his February 7 mem-
orandum. See Memorandum from Sec'y of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, to Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Status of Taliban and Al Qaida (Jan. 19, 2002), available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun2004/d20040622docl.pdf [hereinafter Rum-
sfeld Memo]. These prior documents indicate that prior to January 19, 2002, the
United States had determined that al Qaeda and Taliban detainees were not entitled to
POW status under the 1949 Geneva Conventions. See Rumsfeld Memo, sup-a, at 1; see
also Gonzales Taliban Memo, supra note 66, at 1.
85. See supra notes 26-46 and accompanying text.
86. See Ashcroft Letter, supra note 75.
87. See President Bush Memo, supra note 25, at 1.
88. See id. at 1-2.
89. See id.
90. See supra note 84 (discussing evidence that the President had made previous
determinations concerning the Geneva Conventions and the conflict with Afghanistan
on January 18, 2002).
91. See President Bush Memo, supra note 25, at 2.
92. See id.
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of international law, Taliban fighters were not entitled to protec-
tion because of their conduct on the battlefield.
Finally, the President resolved the issue of application of
Common Article 3 to the conflict. Again accepting DOJ analysis,
the President determined that Common Article 3 protections ap-
plied to neither al Qaeda nor Taliban detainees.93 Each conflict,
with al Qaeda and against the Taliban, entailed international as-
pects that precluded application of Common Article 3. Citing
the text of the Article, the President emphasized, "[C]ommon
Article 3 applies only to 'armed conflict not of an international
character.' "
Viewed from the perspective of judge advocates, this re-
stricted reading of Common Article 3 is somewhat surprising.
International courts, tribunals, and scholars have taken a pro-
gressively expansive view of the scope of conflicts covered by
Common Article 3.95 The expansion of the scope of Common
Article 3 is largely credited to the very fundamental, and hereto-
fore uncontroversial, protections afforded by Common Article
3.96 Courts, and until recently States, had not mustered signifi-
cant objections to the application of Common Article 3 to any
conflict - international, civil or another classified conflict.
Indeed, the Army Judge Advocate General's School ('JAG
School") had incorporated universal application of Common Ar-
ticle 3 into its instruction of the law of war to all judge advo-
cates.97 The School had given Common Article 3 special empha-
93. See id.
94. Id.
95. See, e.g., COMMENTARY, IV GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF
CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR 50 (Jean S. Pictet ed., 1958) [hereinafter GC IV Com-
MENTARY] (arguing that Common Article 3 should be applied "as widely as possible");
Kenneth Watkin, Controlling the Use of Force: A Role for Human Rights Norms in Contempo-
rary Armed Conflict, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 3 (2004) ("The immediate post-World War II
recognition of a broader concept of armed conflict is also reflected in the term 'armed
conflict not of an international character' found in common Article 3 of the 1949 Ge-
neva Conventions.").
96. Common Article 3 provides protection from, inter alia, hostage-taking, irregu-
lar trial proceedings, murder, mutilation, summary executions, and torture. See Geneva
III, supra note 4, art. 3.
97. See INT'L & OPERATIONAL LAW DEP'T, U.S. ARMY JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S
LEGAL CENTER & SCHOOL, DEP'T OF THE ARMY, LAW OF WAR HANDBOOK 143-44 (2004)
[hereinafter LOW HANDBOOK]; see also INT'L & OPERATIONAL LAW DEP'T, U.S. ARMY
JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S LEGAL CENTER & SCHOOL, DEP'T OF THE ARMY, 53D JUDGE
ADVOCATE GRADUATE COURSE INT'L LAw DESKBOOK 1-6-7 (2004) [hereinafter JAG GRAD
COURSE DESKBOOK]; INT'L & OPERATIONAL LAw DEP'T, U.S. ARMvJAG's LEGAL CENTER &
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sis in its instruction to new judge advocates, those occupying op-
erational billets, as well as those pursuing their Master of Laws
Degree in the year-long Graduate Course.9" To many, liberal ap-
plication of Common Article 3 was thought appropriate to ad-
dress gaps in the Conventions' protections.99 With its very fun-
damental guarantees of humane treatment, Common Article 3
was thought to operate as a "floor" of treatment for all persons
in all conflicts. 100
Ultimately, the President's determination concerning Com-
mon Article 3 may not prove to be the final word on the matter.
On November 8, 2004, U.S. District Judge James Robertson ren-
SCHOOL, DEP'T OF THE ARMY, 165TH JUDGE ADVOCATE OFFICER BASIC COURSE INT'L LAW
DESKBOOK H-14-15 (2004) [hereinafter JAOBC DESKBoOK]. A review of editions of the
above-cited JAG School publications dating to the Fall of 1998 reveals treatment of
Common Article 3 consistent with the positions rejected by the DOJ memo.
98. See infra notes 113-19 and accompanying text (discussing curriculum ofjudge
advocates and the Army Judge Advocate General's Legal Center and School).
99. Shortly after the Geneva Conventions came into force, many States and the
International Committee of the Red Cross ("ICRC") perceived shortcomings and gaps
in protections. By 1977, this led to a set of Additional Protocols to the Conventions. See
Protocol I, supra note 16, art. 75 (incorporating fundamental humanitarian and due
process guarantees for persons who did not benefit from the original Convention's pro-
tections). Common Article 3 purports to offer protection to persons "in the power of a
Party to the conflict and who do not benefit from more favourable treatment under the
Conventions ...." Id. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August
1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts,
Jun. 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter Protocol II]. The United States has not
ratified either Protocol to the Conventions and has persistently objected to the opera-
tion of several articles of Protocol I. See Matheson, supra note 16, at 425. The United
States has not, to the Authors' knowledge, stated any objections to Article 75.
100. The Army JAG School Law of War Handbook observes that Common Article
3 "serves as a 'minimum yardstick of protection' in all conflicts, not just internal armed
conflicts." LOW HANDBOOK, supra note 97, at 144 (quoting Nicar. v. U.S., [1986] I.C.J.
Rep. 14, 218, [1986] 25 I.L.M. 1023)). SeeJAG COURSE DEsiBOOK, supra note 97, at I-
15 (citing Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, [1995] Int'l Crim. Trib.
for Fmr. Yugoslavia, reprinted in [1996] 35 I.L.M. 32); see also GC IV COMMENTARY supra
note 95, at 14 (referring to Article 3 as a "minimum requirement"). This apparent
divergence in views between DOJ and some DOD departments is perhaps best ex-
plained by the January 22 Memorandum's methodology. The Memorandum frames its
analysis under the offenses under the War Crimes Act. See Bybee Memo, supra note 26,
at 1-4. DOJ lawyers' restrictive reading of Common Article 3 thus limits potential crimi-
nal exposure of policymakers and commanders under the Act. See id. Judge advocates
had viewed Common Article 3 as working in conjunction with Article 75 of Protocol I,
as well to fill the gaps of Geneva IV. With the maturation of much of Protocol I, Com-
mon Article 3 may no longer be needed as a gap-filler. Furthermore the evolution of
fundamental human rights law makes the expansive reading of Common Article 3 no
longer necessary.
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dered a decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 10 ' a habeas action chal-
lenging the legality of military commissions established to try de-
tainees held at the U.S. detention facility at Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba. The plaintiff, a citizen of Yemen captured in Afghanistan,
argued that Common Article 3, among other provisions of the
1949 Geneva Conventions, prohibited the conditions under
which he was detained and to be tried.112 The government
countered with the strict reading of Common Article 3 adopted
in the presidential determinations discussed above, emphasizing
the international aspects of the conflict in which it had detained
Hamdan. 10 3 Judge Robertson rejected the government's argu-
ments, holding that it is "universally agreed" that the humanita-
rian norms of Common Article 3 applied to international as well
as internal armed conflict.'0 4 The government has appealed the
decision to the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, which is expected
to hear the case in April 2005.105
Subsequent legal challenges notwithstanding, the Presi-
dent's February 7 determinations clearly constituted conclusive
legal guidance for the DOD in its prosecution of the phases of
the Global War on Terrorism that followed. While they adopted
most of the DOJ and White House Counsel recommendations,
the President's decisions simultaneously addressed at least one
chief concern of the State Department, and presumably the
101. 344 F. Supp. 2d 152 (D.D.C. 2004).
102. See id. at 156.
103. See id. at 160-63 (distinguishing the U.S. conflict with al Qaeda from a conflict
between the United States and Afghanistan, arguing that Hamden and al Qaeda do not
pass the test to qualify for POW status, and asserting that Common Article 3 does not
apply to international conflicts).
104. See id. at 162-63. Judge Robertson expressly declined to evaluate the military
commissions' procedures against the rather general and ambiguous due process guar-
antee announced in Common Article 3. See id. at 165-66.
105. See United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, 60-Day
Sitting Calendar, at http://pacer.cadc.uscourts.gov/common/courtrm/60day.html
(last visited Mar. 12, 2005). In unrelated litigation addressing habeas corpus petitions
filed by detainees held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, a federal district court from the
District of Columbia made similar determinations with respect to the Geneva Conven-
tions. In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F.Supp.2d 443 (D.D.C. 2005). In In re Guan-
tanamo Detainee Cases, Judge Joyce Hens Green held that the Geneva Conventions pro-
tected Taliban fighters detained at Guantanamo and constituted a self-executing cause
of action supporting the detainees' habeas petitions. See id. at 479. Judge Green did
not, however, address specifically Common Article 3 as it related to the detainees or its
application to the international armed conflict with Afghanistan. The Government has
appealed Judge Green's decision to the D.C. Court of Appeals.
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DOD's concern: the legal status of U.S. forces in Afghanistan
and in the Global War on Terrorism.
Interestingly, by applying the Geneva Conventions to the
conflict, the United States appeared to have reserved for itself
the best of two worlds - at least legally speaking. First, it sus-
tained its tradition of liberally applying the Geneva Conventions
to armed conflict. At the same time, however, by determining
that the Taliban did not meet Geneva POW qualifications, the
United States would not be restricted by the Third Geneva Con-
vention in its treatment of Taliban detainees. Second, applying
the Conventions to the conflict would preserve the United
States' legal argument for insisting on POW status for its own
armed forces as, presumably, U.S. forces would exercise great
caution to ensure they met the POW qualifications at all
times. 106
It is significant that neither the aforementioned memo-
randa, nor any other publicly available, contemporaneous au-
thority, addressed the potential application of the Fourth Ge-
neva Convention. Attention at the time seemed to have focused
exclusively on application of the Third Geneva Convention. Yet
as mentioned previously, each of the four 1949 Geneva Conven-
tions is triggered by the same criteria under Common Article
2.107 Thus when the administration determined that it would ap-
106. Some authors have explored whether U.S. armed forces carried this through
with respect to distinctive insignia during Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan.
See, e.g., Maj. William H. Ferrell, III, No Shirt, No Shoes, No Status: Uniforms, Distinction,
and Special Operations in International Armed Conflict, 178 MI. L. REv. 94 (2003) (examin-
ing the direct relationship between POW status and the wearing of a distinctive sign);
W. Hays Parks, Special Forces' Wear of Non-Standard Uniforms, 4 CHI. J. INT'L L. 493 (2003).
107. Common Article 2 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions states in relevant part:
In addition to the provisions which shall be implemented in peacetime, the
present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other
armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting
Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them.
The Convention shall also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation of
the territory of a High Contracting Party, even if the said occupation meets
with no armed resistance.
Although one of the Powers in conflict may not be a party to the present
Convention, the Powers who are [P]arties thereto shall remain bound by it in
their mutual relations. They shall furthermore be bound by the Convention in
relation to the said Power, if the latter accepts and applies the provisions
thereof.
Geneva I, supra note 4, art. 2; Geneva II, supra note 4, art. 2; Geneva III, supra note 4,
art. 2; Geneva IV, supra note 4, art. 2.
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ply "Geneva" to the conflict with the Taliban, as a matter of
course, all four Geneva Conventions would clearly apply in their
entirety.108
The failure to discuss the Fourth Geneva Convention thus
raised a number of questions for judge advocates. First, should
one infer that the administration regarded the Fourth Geneva
Convention as inapposite to the conflict? That is, once bifur-
cated into separate conflicts against al Qaeda and the Taliban,
did the administration determine that neither conflict impli-
cated civilians protected under the Fourth Convention? Alterna-
tively, did the administration's assertion that the Geneva Con-
ventions applied necessarily position these detainees under the
Fourth Convention as civilians, though they might simultane-
ously be unlawful combatants? This position does not seem to
be supported by subsequent analysis of lawful interrogation
methods to be employed against these detainees. That is, had
the administration regarded these persons as protected under
the Fourth Convention, especially those meeting the nationality
criteria of Article 4,109 one might reasonably have expected anal-
ysis of the Fourth Geneva Convention in the so-called "Torture
Memo" and other interrogation-related documents.' Or fi-
108. See President Bush Memo, supra note 25, at 2 (concluding that "the provisions
of Geneva will apply to our present conflict with the Taliban.').
109. See infra notes 192-200 and accompanying text.
110. Our review of the series of publicly available administration memoranda and
legal reviews drafted in 2002 and associated with interrogation methods and counter-
resistance techniques does not reveal any discussion or mention of the Fourth Geneva
Convention. See Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att'y Gen., Office of Legal
Counsel, DOJ, to WilliamJ. Haynes, II, Gen. Counsel, DOD, Potential Legal Constraints
Applicable to Interrogations of Persons Captured by U.S. Armed Forces in Afghanistan
(Feb. 26, 2002), available at http://www2.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB127/
02.02.26.pdf; Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att'y Gen., Office of Legal
Counsel, DOJ, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the Pres., Standards of Conduct for
Interrogation Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A (Aug. 1, 2002), available at http://www.
washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/documents/dojinterrogationmemo20020801 .pdf
[hereinafter Gonzales Torture Statute Memo]; Memorandum from William J. Haynes,
II, Gen. Counsel, DOD, Counter-Resistance Techniques (Nov. 27, 2002), available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/2004/nr20040622-0930.html [hereinafter
Haynes Counter-Resistance Memo]; Memorandum from Gen. James T. Hill, Com-
mander, DOD, to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Counter-Resistance Tech-
niques (Oct. 25, 2002), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun2004/
d20040622doc4.pdf, Memorandum from Maj. Gen. Michael B. Dunlavey, Command-
ing, DOD, to U.S. S. Command, Counter-Resistance Strategies (Oct. 11, 2002), available
at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun2004/d20040622doc3.pdf; Memorandum
from Lt. Col. Diane Beaver, Staff Judge Advocate, DOD, to Commander, Joint Task
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nally, had the administration merely overlooked the Fourth Con-
vention altogether? That is, following their determination that
Taliban fighters did not qualify for protection under the Third
Geneva Convention, did the administration merely neglect to
Force 170, Legal Review of Aggressive Interrogation Techniques (Oct. 11, 2002), availa-
ble at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun2004/d2004O622doc3.pdf [hereinafter JTF
170 Legal Review]; Memorandum from Memorandum from Lt. Col. Diane Beaver, Staff
Judge Advocate, DOD, to Commander, Joint Task Force 170, Legal Brief on Proposed
Counter-Resistance Strategies (Oct. 11, 2002), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/
news/Jun2004/d20040622doc3.pdf [hereinafterJTF 170 Legal Brief].
The first memorandum addressing the Fourth Geneva Convention appears to be
the 2003 product of the Department of Defense Working Group. See DOD, Working
Group Report on Detainee Interrogations in the Global War on Terrorism: Assessment
of Legal, Historical, Policy, and Operational Considerations (Apr. 4, 2003), available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun2004/d20040622doc8.pdf [hereinafter Working
Group Report]. The report anticipates that other governments might assert that de-
tainees determined not to be entitled to POW status would be entitled to protection
under the Fourth Geneva Convention. See id. at 58-61 (noting that the Fourth Conven-
tion may inform the views of other countries as they assess U.S. actions). The report
notes: " 'Every person in enemy hands must have some status under international law;
he is either a prisoner of war, and as such covered by the Third Geneva Convention, a
civilian covered by the Fourth Geneva Convention, or again, a member of the medical
personnel of the armed forces who is covered by the First Convention. There is no
intermediate status; nobody in enemy hands can be outside the law."' Id. at n.64 (quot-
ing GC IV COMMENTARY, supra note 100, art. 4, 4). The report further explains that
other States may object to the U.S. view that the Fourth Geneva Convention is inappli-
cable to unlawful combatants seized in the war on terror. See id. Addressing customary
international law, however, the Working Group observes: "The Department of Justice
has determined that [the Fourth Convention] applies only to civilians but does not
apply to unlawful combatants." Id. at 61. Although the Working Group references this
conclusion of the DOJ twice, neither instance includes a citation to a specific memoran-
dum from DOJ. See id. at 4, 61. The possibility remains that such guidance to the Work-
ing Group from the DOJ has not been made publicly available. At any rate, an inter-
view conducted by the authors with a military attorney assigned to Combined Joint Task
Force 7 ("CJTF-7"), the headquarters for post conflict stability and support operations
in Iraq, indicates that staff did not have access to either the Working Group Report's
conclusions regarding the Fourth Geneva Convention or the DOJ bases for those con-
clusions. See Interview with Maj. Daniel Kazmier, Student, 53rd Judge Advocate Officer
Graduate Course (Nov. 5, 2004) (on file with authors). Indeed, the staff products of
the CJTF-7 legal staff appear to contradict the conclusion that the Fourth Geneva Con-
vention did not apply to unlawful combatants in Iraq. See infra notes 242-49 and accom-
panying text.
To the Authors' knowledge, at present the only DOJ memorandum addressing the
Fourth Convention that has been made public addresses Article 49 thereof in the con-
text of transferring or deporting protected persons under the Fourth Convention in the
context of belligerent occupation. See Draft Memorandum from Jack Goldsmith, Assis-
tant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, for Alberto Gonzales, Counsel to the
President, Re: Permissibility of Relocating Certain "protected Persons from Occupied
Iraq (Mar. 19, 2004) available at http://library.uchastings.edu/library/Library%201n-
formation/News%20and%20FAQ/doj-marchl9.pdf.
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consider that they might be civilians for purposes of the law of
war? As fighters failing to qualify for protection under the Third
Geneva Convention, were the Taliban truly extra-conventional
persons? And should judge advocates expect to classify and in-
struct commanders to treat other unlawful combatants similarly
situated, as falling entirely outside the governance of the Geneva
Conventions, including the Fourth? We will address these ques-
tions in the following section, focusing first on the resources and
training available to judge advocates faced with this and similar
dilemmas in Operation Iraqi Freedom. As a new phase in the
Global War on Terrorism opened and judge advocates consid-
ered such questions in the absence of definitive guidance, they
seemed to rely on their previous education and training.
II. THE JUDGE ADVOCATE EDUCATIONAL AND
OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
On March 19, 2003, the United States launched a series of
air and missile strikes against targets in Iraq as the opening shots
of Operation Iraqi Freedom.'' One day later, armored forma-
tions of the U.S. Army Third Infantry Division and First Marine
Expeditionary Force crossed into Iraqi territory in an attack that
would ultimately culminate on April 9th with the effective occu-
pation of Baghdad. 1 2 Although the conflict would be touted as
111. See David E. Sanger & John F. Burns, Threats and Responses: The White House;
Bush Orders Start of War on Iraq, Missiles Apparently Miss Hussein, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20,
2003, at Al (noting that "President Bush ordered the start of the war against Iraq on
[March 19, 2003]"); see also Donald H. Rumsfeld, The Price of War in Iraq, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 19, 2004, at A23 (noting the "one-year anniversary of the beginning of Operation
Iraqi Freedom").
112. See Michael R. Gordon, A Nation at War: Strategy; Push to Finish the Job, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 9, 2003, at Al (noting that within days of starting the war, Army and Marine
forces had moved into Iraqi territory); see also Rajiv Chandrasekaran & Thomas E. Ricks,
U.S. Airstrikes Open War on Iraq; Baghdad Hit in Early Morning as Ground Troops Prepare to
Cross Border, WASH. POsT, Mar. 20, 2003, at A01 (detailing initial U.S. military operations
in Iraq). The date of the beginning of the legal occupation of Iraq by the U.S.-led
coalition is a subject of debate. The legal standard for commencement of an occupa-
tion is stated in the regulations annexed to the 1907 Hague Convention IV. Article 42
of these regulations states: "Territory is considered occupied when it is actually placed
under the authority of the hostile army. The occupation extends only to the territory
where such authority has been established and can be exercised." Hague Convention
Respecting The Laws and Customs of War on Land, with Annexed Regulations, Oct. 18,
1907, 36 Stat. 2277, art. 42 [hereinafter Hague IV]. At any rate, effort to isolate a single
date on which occupation began may prove fruitless as well as irrelevant. As Article 42
above indicates, occupation law recognizes cases of partial occupation. See id.; see also
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part of the Global War on Terrorism, would deploy many of the
same units, and would unfold contemporaneously with the cam-
paign in Afghanistan, Operation Iraqi Freedom proved to be a
substantially different fight than the campaigns waged previously
in the GWOT.
The distinction from previous operations was especially
stark in legal terms. First, from the outset of the conflict, the
Geneva Conventions clearly applied. The following section out-
lines the legal methodology available to judge advocates in this
new phase of operations. This section presents first an orienta-
tion to the legal methodology employed by judge advocates
when discerning relevant legal standards. Second, we analyze
those provisions of the law of war immediately relevant to treat-
ment of civilians and unlawful combatants.
A. The Judge Advocate Professional Education and Training System
1. The United States Army Judge Advocate General's Legal
Center and School
The Judge Advocate General's Legal Center and School
('JAG School") is located on the grounds of the University of
Virginia in Charlottesville. It is charged with the mission to con-
duct a graduate legal education program culminating in the
award of a Master of Laws degree for all Army judge advocates,
judge advocates from other armed services, and Army civilian at-
torneys. The Center and School offers both resident and non-
resident courses of study for judge advocates and attorneys em-
ployed by the federal government. In addition, the Center and
School develops and provides legal training for other members
of the ArmyJudge Advocate General's Corps ('JAG Corps") and
senior Army commanders. It prescribes legal curricula for other
Army schools and activities, supports the broader military legal
community "by providing access to digital and written legal
materials and other assistance, and develops doctrine for legal
support to the Army."' 1 3
Geneva IV, supra note 4, art. 2 ("The Conventions shall apply to all cases of partial or
total occupation of the territory of a High Contracting Party") (emphasis added). Thus,
an occupation might legitimately be understood to come into existence as a gradual or
incremental process rather than on any single date or following a particular event or
battle.
113. See U.S. Army Judge Advocate General's Corps, at http://www.JAGCNET.
army.mil (last visited Mar. 8, 2005) [hereinafter JAGCNET] (providing link to The
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The JAG School mission statement includes, among other
things, a mandate to educate "all Army judge advocates, judge
advocates from the other armed services, and Army civilian attor-
neys; offer[ ] resident and nonresident courses of study for
judge advocates and attorneys employed by the Federal Govern-
ment; develop[ ] or provide[ ] legal training for other members
of the Army Judge Advocate General's Corps and senior Army
commanders; prescribe[ ] legal curricula for other Army schools
and activities; support[ I] the military legal community by provid-
ing access to digital and written legal materials and other assis-
tance; and develop[ ] doctrine for legal support of the Army." '14
The JAG School educates and trains more than 6,000 resident
and non-resident students every year, using a combination of
long and short course approaches, as well as web-based training
modules, to accomplish the mission. Short courses of various
types and durations, on a wide variety of subject matter, convene
at the JAG School throughout the year.1 15
The crown jewel of the JAG School's courses, though, is its
longest resident course, the Judge Advocate Officer Graduate
Course. 1 6 The purpose of the Graduate Course is to educate,
develop, and inspire soldier-leader-lawyers for increasingly com-
plex service across a broad spectrum of legal disciplines and in
positions of greater responsibility. Attendees typically rank as
Judge Advocate General's Legal Center and School); see alsoJudge Advocate General's
Legal Center and School ("JAG School"), at http://www.jagcnet.army.mil/JAGCNE-
TINTERNET/HOMEPAGES/AC/TJAGSAWEB.NSF/Main?OpenFrameset (last visited
Mar. 8, 2005) [hereinafterJAG School].
114. JAG School, supra note 113, at Mission Statement. See FM 27-100, supra note
12, at 2-5.
115. See, e.g.,JAG School, supra note 113, at Administrative and Civil Dep't ("Multi-
ple short courses are held on an annual basis.").
116. See id. at Graduate Program. The JAG School offers a second resident course
for military lawyers, the Judge Advocate Officer Basic Course ("JAOBC"). This course is
14 weeks in duration and is offered to all new attorneys entering the U.S. Army. It is
conducted in two phases. Phase one is four weeks at Fort Lee, Virginia, and focuses
new soldier-lawyers on field craft: judge advocates are trained in skills such as use of
weapons, land navigation, and defense against biological, chemical, and nuclear attack.
Phase two training is ten weeks at the School in Charlottesville, and concentrates on the
practice of military law. See id. Upon completion ofJAOBC, students move throughout
the Army to operational assignments. See id. at Course Schedule (noting the duration of
the phases); see also id. at Judge Advocate Officer Basic Course (describing the activities
of each phase); Career Service Guide to the JAG Corps, Frequently Asked Questions, at
http://www.jagcnet.army.mil/JARO (last visited Mar. 8, 2005) (noting that after the
basic course, officers proceed to their duty assignments).
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junior Majors or senior Captains. Upon completion of the rigor-
ous ten-month course of study, students are awarded a Master of
Laws degree in Military Law.1 17 Graduates of this course typically
move to operational assignments in positions of great responsi-
bility as leaders of large legal organizations and advisors to oper-
ational commanders.
The International and Operational Law Department is one
of four academic departments within the JAG School. Its pri-
mary mission is to train judge advocates of all armed services and
other attorneys within the DOD and federal government in In-
ternational and Operational Law, especially the law of war."
The Department fulfills its mission in the same manner de-
scribed above - by providing instruction to resident and non-
resident students in both long- and short-course formats. Long-
course resident students, such as those in the Basic and Gradu-
ate Courses described above, receive a comprehensive course of
instruction including academic lectures, seminar sessions, and
practically-oriented exercises.119
Short-course students return to the School for education
geared to present or follow-on assignments. This curriculum in-
cludes specialized courses on the Law of War, Intelligence Law,
Domestic Operations Law, and Operational Law.12 ° The Opera-
tional Law Course, a two-week program designed especially for
judge advocates assigned to operational billets, provides re-
fresher training on many aspects of traditional international law
topics, with a special emphasis on the issues that operational
judge advocates encounter in coalition, joint, and deployed envi-
117. SeeJAG School, supra note 113, at Graduate Program. The school offers spe-
cialties in International and Operational Law, Contract and Fiscal Law, Administrative
and Civil Law, and Criminal Law. See id.
118. See id.
119. See id. at Resident Course Descriptions. The Graduate Course, for example,
studies an international law curriculum including core instruction of approximately 70
lecture hours, more than 20 seminar hours, and additional time set aside for practical
exercise. See id. The core curriculum includes traditional international law topics such
as the History and Framework of the Law of War, the Legal Basis for the Use of Force,
International Agreements, Means and Methods of Warfare and the Law of Air, Sea, and
Space. Study also includes extensive coverage of all four Geneva Conventions, Human
Rights, Post Conflict Governance and Occupation Law, Intelligence Law, National Se-
curity Law, Domestic Operations, and Rules of Engagement. See id. at Graduate Pro-
gram.
120. See supra note 12 and accompanying text; see alsoJAG School, supra note 113,
at International and Operational Law Department.
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ronments. All of the Department's courses are updated continu-
ously to ensure timeliness and relevance, and where appropriate,
they include the infusion of lessons learned from the Combat
Training Centers a21 and real world operations.
Education and training are not limited to the school, how-
ever, as the International Law Department travels frequently to
assist units and organizations with training needs. It is not un-
common, for example, for the Department to design and exe-
cute tailored training to specific commands, organizations, units
or other governmental agencies.
2. The Combat Training Center Methodology
Since the late 1970s, the U.S. Army has employed the Com-
bat Training Center ("CTC") Methodology to prepare its troops,
leaders and units for the rigors of the modem battlefield.
122
The goal of the CTC Methodology is to provide Army units, lead-
ers, and soldiers with thorough, rigorous, stressful, and espe-
cially realistic training in four Combat Training Centers world-
wide. 123 The methodology incorporates three concepts to repli-
cate realistic training conditions. The first is the concept of a
training "box" - a training unit and its personnel are isolated
within geographic boundaries-the conditions of which repli-
cate the real world environment to the maximum extent possi-
ble. 124 Second, the CTC concept employs an "opposing force"
- a force, usually of superior numbers, trained, equipped, and
skilled in the doctrine, strategy and tactics of the contemplated
enemy. 125 This opposing force, or "OPFOR" as it is known, en-
gages the training unit in force-on-force maneuver with a view
toward providing units and leaders with a realistic assessment of
121. See infra note 123.
122. See Center for Law and Military Operations, In the Operations Center: A
Judge Advocate's Guide to the Battle Command Training Program 16 (1996), available
at https://www.jagcnet.army.mil/eJAWS (last visited Feb. 13, 2005) ("At least three in-
novative training ideas the Army worked on in the late 1970's crystallized at NTC, which
was under development for several years before it welcomed the first training unit [es-
tablished in October 1981].").
123. The four Combat Training centers are the National Training Center in Fort
Irwin, California, the Combat Maneuver Training Center in Hohenfels, Germany, the
Joint Readiness Training Center in Fort Polk, Louisiana, and the Battle Command
Training Program at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. See id. at 13-14, 265.
124. See id. at 16.
125. See id.
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their war fighting abilities.126 The third concept is the employ-
ment of an impartial and objective evaluation element. This ele-
ment, known as the "Operations Group" or "Ops Group," con-
sists of permanently-assigned personnel (called observer-control-
lers) who gather and analyze data on the training unit's
performance with a view toward determining how the unit and
its personnel have completed their wartime tasks.
127
Recognizing that modem military operations have grown,
and continue to grow increasingly complex and legally intense,
the leadership of the Army JAG Corps has staffed, since 1995,
each of the CTCs with at least one judge advocate observer-con-
troller. These officers' mission is to insert legal scenarios into
unit training and to evaluate the training unit's responses to
them. Commensurate with this recognition, of course, is the re-
alization that commanders, staffs, and soldiers operating in the
contemporary operating environment benefit from the assign-
ment of a judge advocate to their units.
Judge advocates, then, are assigned to every brigade-sized
element (and sometimes to smaller maneuver units, depending
on need).128 These attorneys accompany their units on all mis-
sions-both real world and training. Units scheduled for de-
ployment conduct Mission Rehearsal Exercises at one of the
Training Centers. In contemplation of the Mission Rehearsal
Exercise, exercise designers, including judge advocates assigned
to the Training Center, fashion a realistic training scenario in-
tended to prepare the unit for the mission ahead.
Units deploying to Kosovo, for example, entered a training
environment that replicated the Balkans down to the minute de-
tail. Exact cities and towns were replicated physically and filled
with role players speaking the native language. Judge advocate
observer-controllers inserted legal vignettes fashioned from the
latest lessons learned taken from the Balkan theater of opera-
tions to create the most realistic and complete training possi-
ble. 129
126. See id.
127. See id. at 16-17.
128. See Center for Law and Military Operations, CLAMO REPORT: Preparation Tips
for the Deployment ofa Brigade Operational Law Team (BOLT), 2001-JULY ARMY LAw. 51, 51
(2001).
129. See generally CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, LAW AND MILITARY
OPERATIONS IN Kosovo, 1999-2001: LESSONS LEARNED FOR JUDGE ADVOCATES (2001),
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The same remains true for Operation Enduring Freedom
and Operation Iraqi Freedom: extensive training and prepara-
tion precede every unit's deployment into active theaters of op-
eration. Mission Rehearsal Exercises, for example, are being
conducted at all four training centers, and training units con-
front realistic training scenarios inclusive of legal lessons learned
(such as Rules of Engagement and targeting issues) imported
directly from Afghanistan and Iraq. 130
3. Garrison Organizational Training and Supervisory
Attorney Concepts
As noted previously, and as should be apparent throughout
this Article, modern military operations are more legally intense
than ever before. The operational tempo - or the rate at which
units train and deploy - has increased similarly. 13 ' Both factors
combine to place increased emphasis on JAG Corps leaders to
ensure that their judge advocates know the law applicable to the
area of operations and the mission the unit will perform. The
Army JAG Corps has several internal mechanisms to ensure this
is the case.
The first is the Staff Judge Advocate - the senior military
attorney responsible for a particular legal organization - re-
sponsible as supervisory attorney and trainer for judge advocates
under his command and control. 132 Certainly, the manner in
which individual leaders discharge this responsibility varies with
available at https://wwwjagcnet.army.mil/jagcnetintranet/databases/operational+law/
clamo.nsf/ (DOCUMENTSCATEGORIZED)?OpenView&Count=1500&ExpandView&
RestrictToCategory-public%20Documents (last visited Feb. 4, 2005) [hereinafter Ko-
SOVO LESSON LEARNED].
130. See generally CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, LEGAL LESSONS
LEARNED FROM AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ, MAJOR COMBAT OPERATIONS 2001-2003 (2004),
available at https://www.jagcnet.army.mil/jagcnetintranet/databases/operational+law/
clamo.nsf/ (DOCUMENTSCATEGORIZED) ?OpenView&Count=1500&ExpandView&
RestrictToCategory=Public%20Documents (last visited Mar. 24, 2005) [hereinafter LES-
SONS LEARNED FROM AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ].
131. See Lessons Learned from Afghanistan and Iraq, supra note 107, at 376; see also
Maj. Jeffery D. Lippert, Automatic Appeal Under UCMJ Article 66. Time for a Change, 182
MIL. L. REv. 1, 1 (2004) (discussing the increasing burdens on each service's JAG
Corps).
132. See U.S. DEP'T OF THE ARMY, REGULATION 27-1, JUDGE ADVOCATE LEGAL SER-
VICES 12-14 (Sept. 30, 1996), available at http://www.army.mil/usapa/epubs/pdf/r27_1.
pdf (describing the designation and responsibilities of supervisory judge advocates); see
also FM 27-100, supra note 12, at 2-10 to 2-11 (describing the role of Staff Judge Advo-
cates).
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individuals and circumstances. Common among most Army le-
gal organizations, however, are established and regimented legal
training and leader development programs. Such programs typi-
cally involve in-house instruction on legal or military topics of
current or local interest. They normally go well beyond strictly
legal topics, as the JAG Corps has long appreciated the impor-
tance of having their officers and legal personnel well-versed in
the traditions of military service.
In addition to this in-house training, it is common for de-
ploying units to engage in their own training prior to deploy-
ment to a training center for Mission Rehearsal Exercises or sim-
ilar events. Members of the command's legal organization are
nearly always involved in such activities and use such events to
train not only legal personnel, but the rest of the command and
staff of the organization. Legal personnel typically occupy space
in the Tactical Operations Center, which the unit's command
and staff uses as its headquarters. Judge advocates are, there-
fore, integrally involved in nearly every aspect of military opera-
tions."'
Another aspect of oversight and training is the Judge Advo-
cate General's statutory obligation to visit judge advocates, wher-
ever located, in the field to supervise the administration of their
duties."3 4 This responsibility is discharged personally by either
the Judge Advocate General or the Assistant Judge Advocate
General, who regularly visit every legal organization in the Army,
whether deployed or in garrison. Such visits are taken seriously
and feature comprehensive examination of the manner in which
such organizations conduct the legal mission. Visits with senior
tactical commanders are conducted with a view toward examin-
ing the nature and quality of legal services rendered to them.
These "Article 6 visits" also include detailed analysis of local
training programs.
4. Legal Doctrine
Field Manual 27-100, Legal Support to Operations, is the
Army's capstone legal doctrinal manual. It describes the mis-
sions and operations of JAGC organizations, units, and person-
133. See FM 27-100, supra note 12, at 5-9 to 5-24 (describing the various aspects of
military operations in which judge advocates participate).
134. See 10 U.S.C. § 806, art. 6(a) (2004).
2005]
716 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL
nel supporting Army operations.' Given the legally intensive
nature of modern operations, it is imperative that legal support
to operations be integrated thoroughly into all aspects of opera-
tions to ensure compliance with law and policy and to provide
responsive, quality legal services.
Army legal doctrine provides comprehensive guidance for
legal training, organizational, and materiel development. It con-
tains guidance for commanders, Staff Judge Advocates, staffs,
and otherJAG Corps personnel. It also implements Joint (other
military services) and Army doctrine and incorporates lessons
learned from recent operations. 136 The manual delineates roles
and responsibilities within the JAG Corps and subordinate orga-
nizations and, perhaps most importantly, provides specific gui-
dance on operational law and the core legal disciplines support-
ing Army operations: international law, military justice, adminis-
trative law, civil law, claims, and legal assistance.1 3 7
More importantly for our purposes, Army legal doctrine di-
rectly and specifically addresses the role of international law in
all types of operations. It covers, for example, such topics as
treatment of civilians, status of forces, rules of engagement, and
international as well as interagency relationships. 3 1 It also ad-
dresses subjects like humanitarian assistance, Nation assistance,
peace operations, and combating terrorism.139
The last doctrinal topic to consider is transformation; the
process by which all military services, but especially the Army,
are undergoing change in response to the contemporary operat-
ing environment. Much has been written and discussed about
this subject. Doctrine is a critical element in establishing
thoughtful and orderly transformation, as it provides concrete
guidance and ensures that effective and comprehensive legal
support will continue to be provided across the spectrum of op-
erations.
135. See preface to FM 27-100, supra note 12.
136. See id. at vii-ix.
137. See id. at 3-1.
138. See id. at 6-10 to 6-13.
139. See id. at 6-6 to 6-8.
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5. The Center for Law and Military Operations and the
Lessons Learned Methodology
The Army's JAG Corps has established The Center for Law
and Military Operations ("CLAMO")14 ° to examine military op-
erations, extract legal lessons learned, and devise training strate-
gies for addressing those issues.141 The Center's mission is to
capture lessons related by the legal personnel who actually
served in theater and, when necessary to better understand the
lesson, and to elaborate upon the underlying legal issue. 14 2 The
lessons learned are imparted to CLAMO and other gathering or-
ganizations in a variety of ways.
Unit legal officers as well as individual judge advocates and
paralegals have provided written "after-action reports." CLAMO
personnel have traveled to units and conducted multi-day review
conferences memorialized by recorded transcripts. CLAMO
conducts video and audio taped interviews with legal personnel
in theater as well as those passing through the JAG School for
further training and education. In addition, CLAMO conducts
scores of informal telephonic and in-person interviews and email
exchanges with personnel involved in operations. Finally,
CLAMO collects and archives numerous primary documents
from the operations, ranging from legal annexes to complex
planning and policy documents. 143
These lessons are then used to devise training strategies that
will prepare judge advocates to meet the myriad training and
140. See id. at 2-5. The Center for Law and Military Operations ("CLAMO") is
located at the ArmyJudge Advocate General's Legal Center and School and serves as a
resource for operational lawyers. It seeks to fulfill its mission in five ways: first, it is the
central repository within the JAGC for all-source data/information, memoranda, after-
action materials and lessons learned pertaining to legal support to operations, interna-
tional and domestic; second, it supports judge advocates by analyzing all data and infor-
mation, developing lessons learned across all military disciplines, and by disseminating
those lessons learned and other operational information to the Army, Marine Corps,
andJoint communities through publications, instruction, training, and databases acces-
sible to operational forces world-wide; third, it supports judge advocates in the field by
responding to requests for assistance; fourth, it integrates lessons learned from opera-
tions and the Combat Training Centers into emerging doctrine and into the curricula
of all relevant courses, workshops, orientations, and seminars conducted at the JAG
Center and School; and fifth, in conjunction with the center and School, sponsors con-
ferences and symposia on topics of interest to operational lawyers. See id. at 2-5 to 2-6.
141. See id. at 2-5.
142. See LESSONS LEARNED FROM AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ, supra note 130, at 2.
143. See id.
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legal challenges that face them across the spectrum of opera-
tions. The lessons are the subject of extensive Lessons Learned
Handbooks1 44 which are distributed to the force. They are then
incorporated into the curriculum taught in the International
and Operational Law Department as well as other JAG School
Departments.
For our purposes, CLAMO's 2004 work regarding major
combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq is the most relevant
of such Lessons Learned Handbooks. All of 456 pages in length,
this document, which is distributed worldwide and available to at
the JAG Corps and CLAMO websites, 14 5 offers the most compre-
hensive look to date at legal issues that confronted judge advo-
cates and commanders in both theaters of operations.
B. Judge Advocates' Experience with the Law of War
One of the most persistent and prominent lessons learned
from previous military operations is the need to determine the
legal nature of the conflict. The Kosovo Lessons Learned Hand-
book, for example, cited the following principle lesson for judge
advocates: "Agreement Must Be Reached on the Applicability of
the Law of Armed Conflict Prior to Commencement of Opera-
tions." '1 46 That document further states that:
[B] oth prior to and during the early days of the air campaign,
disagreement existed within U.S. and NATO political and le-
gal circles over whether or not [the Law of Armed Conflict
("LOAC")] applied to Operation Allied Force. Because
LOAC applies to international armed conflicts, the precise le-
gal issue was whether Operation Allied Force constituted an
international armed conflict. It also seems apparent that po-
litical concerns entered the calculation. 147
Recent experience with the law of war points to three kinds
of conflict, the first and most straightforward of which is interna-
tional armed conflict. According to Common Article 2, the
"Conventions shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any
other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of
144. See, e.g., Kosovo LESSONS LEARNED, supra note 129; LESSONS LEARNED FROM
AFGHANISTAN AND IRAq supra note 130.
145. See generally LESSONS LEARNED FROM AFGHANISTAN AND IRAo, supra note 130.
146. Kosovo LESSONS LEARNED, supra note 129, at 46.
147. Id. at 46-47 (footnotes omitted).
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the High Contracting Parties .... ,"48 Prominent examples of
Common Article 2 conflicts include World War II, Korea,149 Viet-
nam, 150 the Falklands Islands Conflict,15 ' and Operation Desert
Storm. 15 2 Such conflicts are generally rather easy cases from the
International Law perspective. A threshold determination that a
conflict falls within Common Article 2 invokes the full measure
of Geneva Convention protections and orients military practi-
tioners to Field Manual 27-10, the Department of the Army "bi-
ble" on the Law of Land Warfare. 5 3
In the early 1980s, however, new types of operations
emerged. Then-termed Operations Other Than War, or
"OOTW," Military Operations Other Than War, or
"MOOTW,"15' 4 and now often referred to as Stability and Sup-
148. Geneva IV, supra note 4, art. 2.
149. While few people argue whether or not the Korean War was a Common Arti-
cle 2 conflict, there was a question of whether the Geneva Conventions would apply.
The United States did not ratify the Conventions until 1955. However, by July 1950,
North Korea, South Korea, and the United States all agreed to be bound its terms. See
Geneva Conventions in the Korean Hostilities, 33 DEP'T ST. BULL., July 1955, at 69-73. Un-
fortunately, in practice, North Korea routinely abused and killed POWs in violation of
the agreement and the terms of the Geneva Conventions. See SAMUEL C. OGLESBY, 92D
CONG., COMMUNIST TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR: A HISTORICAL SURVEY, PREPARED
FOR THE SEN. SUBCOMM. TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY
ACT AND OTHER INTERNL SECURITY LAws OF THE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY (1972) (dis-
cussing the general mistreatment of POWs at the hands of communist captors).
150. See LAw AND RESPONSIBILITY IN WAFRE: THE VIETNAM EXPERIENCE 13 (Peter
D. Trooboff ed., 1975) (discussing whether the Vietnam conflict constituted an internal
war, or an international armed conflict meeting the requirements of Common Article 2
of the Geneva Conventions). See generally THE VIETNAM WAR AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
(Richard A. Falk, ed. 1968) (analyzing the international legal aspects of the Vietnam
conflict).
151. See James F. Gravelle, The Falkland (Malvinas) Islands: An International Law
Analysis of the Dispute Between Argentina and Great Britain, 107 MIL. L. REV. 5, 5-6 (1985);
see also SYLVIE-STOYANKA JUNOD, PROTECTION OF THE VICTIMS OF THE ARMED CONFLICT
FALKLAND-MALVINAS ISLANDS (1982).
152. See BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW: SELECTED
DOCUMENTS 1397-1419 (1994) [hereinafter CARTER & TRIMBLE] (providing copies of the
U.N. Security Council Resolutions and U.S. documents authorizing the coalition's ac-
tions); see also DOD, FINAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: CONDUCT OF THE PERSIAN GULF WAR
(1992), available at http://www.ndu.edu/library/epubs/cpgw.pdf (last visited Feb. 13,
2005) [hereinafter DOD PERSIAN GULF REPORT]; U.S. NEws AND WORLD REPORT, TRI-
UMPH WITHOUT VICTORY. THE UNREPORTED HISTORY OF THE PERSIAN GULF WAR (1992)
(providing a comprehensive narrative of the conflict in the Persian Gulf).
153. See DEP'T OF THE ARMY, FM 27-10, LAw OF LAND WARFARE (July 18, 1956)
[hereinafter FM 27-10].
154. See DOD, JOINT PUBLICATION 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other
Than War I-1 (Jun. 16, 1995), available at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/newpubs/
jp3_07.pdf.
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port Operations, or "SASO,"155 these operations typically involve
something other than attempts at military victory or occupation
of military territory. The intent, rather, is to establish and main-
tain a safe and secure environment, usually pursuant either to
consent by the Parties or a mandate from the United Nations in
the form of a Security Council resolution. 15 6 Under such cir-
cumstances, the treaties and customary rules constituting the law
of armed conflict do not strictly apply. Prominent examples of
this type of conflict include Grenada 157 and Haiti.15 8  While,
strictly speaking, the full protections of the law of war do not
apply to these operations, it is still, as a matter of practice, impor-
tant that practitioners employ the "right conflict/right person"
analysis.1
59
155. See DEP'T OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 3-07, Stability Operations and Support Op-
erations 1-1 (Feb. 20, 2003), available at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/service-pubs/
fm3_07.pdf [hereinafter FM 3-07]. U.S. forces conduct stability operations and support
operations to deter war, resolve conflict, promote peace, strengthen democratic
processes, promote sustainable and responsive institutions and promote freedom from
oppression, subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. Stability operations promote and
protect U.S. national interests by influencing the threat, political, and informational
dimensions of the operational environment through a combination of peacetime devel-
opmental, cooperative activities and coercive actions in response to crises. Stability op-
erations typically fall into 10 broad types that are neither discrete nor mutually exclu-
sive, such as peace operations, overseas internal defense, security assistance and human-
itarian and civic assistance. Support operations employ Army forces to assist civil
authorities, foreign or domestic, as they prepare for or respond to crises and relieve
suffering. See id. at 1-2 to 1-4. See generally DEP'T OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 3-0, OPERA-
TIONS (Jun. 14, 2001), available at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/service publications_
usarmypubs.htm; DOD, JOINT PUBLICATION 3-07.3, JOINT TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND
PROCEDURES FOR PEACE OPERATIONS (Feb. 12, 1999), available at http://www.dtic.mil/
doctrine/jel/newpubs/ p3_07_3.pdf.
156. See FM 3-07, supra note 130, at 4-2.
157. See DEP'T OF STATE, 3 CUMULATIVE DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN IN-
TERNATIONAL LAw (1981-1988) 3454 (Marian Nash (Leich) ed., 1995) (excerpting a
memorandum from U.S. Judge Advocate General Hugh J. Clausen: "No party to the
hostilities in Grenada has suggested that a state of war exists"). Clausen's memorandum
insisted that the Geneva Conventions apply because "de facto hostilities [exist] on Gre-
nada". Id. See Memorandum, HQDA, DAJA-IA, Subject: Geneva Conventions Status of
Enemy Personnel Captured During URGENT FURY (Nov. 4, 1983); see alsOJOHN NOR-
TON MOORE, LAW AND THE GRENADA MISSION (1984).
158. See Theodore Meron, Extraterritoriality of Human Rights Treaties, 89 Am. J. INT'L
L. 78-82 (1995) ("The agreement of September 18, 1994, negotiated in Port-au-Prince
between President Jimmy Carter and General Raoul Cedras, and its acceptance by the
Aristide government, led to the consent-based, nonviolent, hostilities-free entry of U.S.
forces and their peaceful deployment. In such circumstances, the Geneva Conventions
on the Protection of Victims of War... are not, strictly speaking, applicable.").
159. See infta text accompanying notes 169-76.
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A third type of operations is much harder to categorize.
Falling into this category are operations such as Bosnia,160 Mace-
donia,1 6 1 Panama, 16 2 and Syria. 6 ' The conflict in Bosnia, for ex-
ample, displayed characteristics of both international and inter-
nal armed conflict and was so considered, depending on the lo-
cation and time of the combatant activities. In the Prosecutor v.
Dusko Tadic opinion, the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia determined that the conflict was internal for
the purposes of that indictment, but found the conflict to be
international for the purposes of the Prosecutor v. Delalic indict-
ment.164
In the case of Macedonia, the debate about the characteri-
160. See, e.g., CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, LAW AND MILITARY OPERA-
TIONS IN THE BALKANS 1995-1998: LESSONS LEARNED FORJUDGE ADVOCATES 111-14 (Nov.
13, 1998).
161. See, e.g., Kosovo LESSONS LEARNED, supra note 129, at 47.
162. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PANAMA: ISSUES RELATING TO THE U.S. INVA-
SION, REP. No. NSIAD-91-174FS (1991), available at http://161.203.16.4/d20t9/143716.
pdf (last visited Feb. 8, 2005) [hereinafter GAO PANAMA REPORT]. Initially, the official
U.S. position was that Panama was not an Article 2 conflict. This argument was based
primarily on the fact that the legitimate Government of Panama had invited the United
States to help it reestablish control following Noriega's nullification of the free elec-
tions that resulted in Mr. Endara's election as President. See id.; see also Maj. Richard M.
Whitaker, Civilian Protection Law in Military Operations, 1996-NOV ARMY LAW. 3, 32
(1996). To support this position, concurrent with the invasion, Mr. Endara was sworn
in as President of Panama in the U.S. Southern Command Headquarters one hour
before the invasion occurred; forces were already airborne en route. See GAO PANAMA
REPORT supra, at 4 n.2; see also BoB WooDWARD, THE COMMANDERS 84, 182-83 (1991)
(providing background and details on Operation Just Cause). See generally THOMAS DON-
NELLY ET AL., OPERATION JUST CAUSE: THE STORMING OF PANAMA (1991). After General
Noriega's capture, he petitioned a U.S. federal court claiming POW status under the
Geneva Conventions. See United States v. Noriega, 808 F. Supp. 791, 793 (S.D. Fla.
1992). While the United States argued that Noriega would be treated consistent with the
Convention, it would not agree that he was, in fact, entitled to POW status. See id. at 794.
However, the district court judge found that as a matter of law, the Panama operation
was an Article 2 conflict and granted POW status to Noreiga. See id. at 795-96. Noriega
was ultimately tried, convicted, and sentenced in 1992 to 40 years on drug and racke-
teering charges. See David Margolick, Judge Rules Noriega Is Prisoner of War, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 19, 1992, at A18; see also Larry King, Noriega Pleads Case For Release, USA TODAY, Apr.
22, 1996, at 2D.
163. In 1986, Syria shot down an American fighter plane. See Walter Gary Sharp,
Sr., Revoking an Aggressor's License to Kill Military Forces Serving the United Nations: Making
Deterrence Personal, 22 MD.J. INT'L L. & TRADE 1, 16 (1998). The United States initially
asserted that the law of war had not been triggered as there was no international armed
conflict between the United States and Syria. See id.
164. See Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, [1995] 35 I.L.M. 32, 43,
30; Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. IT-94-1 -A-R77, [2001] 40 I.L.M. 630, 633-34, 8-
15.
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zation of the conflict proved more than academic when Yugoslav
forces captured three U.S. soldiers conducting a security patrol
along the border between the former Yugoslavia and the former
Yugoslav republic of Macedonia on March 31, 1999, just one
week after the air war had begun. 165 The relevant issue, of
course, was the legal status of the soldiers. They could have
been considered POW's, and therefore entitled to the protec-
tions of the Geneva Conventions. Or, they might have been "de-
tainees" entitled to some lesser protections, or perhaps common
criminals, afforded no protections at all.166 The United States
ultimately took the position that Operation Allied Force was an
international armed conflict, and that the subject troops were
POWs under the law of war.167 The United States' failure to set-
tle upon categorization from the outset, however, created confu-
sion for both sides and proved more than a little unsettling -
especially for the three soldiers involved. 1 6
C. The JAG Corps Law of War Methodology
1. JAG Corps Application of the 1949 Geneva Conventions
Interpreting and applying the law of war remains judge ad-
vocates' core function during combat operations. As part of its
mission to educate and train government attorneys for their par-
ticipation in operations such as Operation Iraqi Freedom, the
International Law Department at the Army JAG School has em-
ployed what we refer to as the "Right Kind of Conflict/Right
Kind of Person" inquiry. 169 Students are taught to employ this
methodology at the outset of operations to determine the indi-
vidual status of participants/Parties to the conflict. It is con-
ducted as a bifurcated analysis. The first part concerns the exact
nature of the conflict: is it an armed conflict of an international
nature - commonly referred to as a "Common Article 2 con-
flict?"' 7 ° Or, is it something other than that, such as internal
armed conflict, corhmonly termed a "Common Article 3 con-
flict?"171
165. See, e.g., Kosovo LESSONS LEARNED, supra note 129, at 47.
166. See id.
167. See id.
168. See id. nn.12-13.
169. See LOW HANDBOOK, supra note 97, at 81-90.
170. See id. at 81-84.
171. See id. at 84-86.
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As the foregoing examples illustrate, the operative point is
that the determination of whether or not a conflict rises to the
level of Common Article 2 is a question of fact.172 As was the
case in the DOJ's and President's analysis of the conflict with al
Qaeda , participation of opposing State Parties to the Geneva
Conventions is the most important prerequisite to determining
whether a conflict triggers the law of war. 173
Once students have determined that State Parties to the Ge-
neva Conventions are engaged in hostilities, we instruct them to
scrutinize the nature of the conflict. That is, they must ask
"Have hostilities risen to the level of 'armed conflict?"' "Armed
conflict," is a term drawn directly from Common Article 2. It has
long been understood to operate as a relatively low threshold.
According to Jean Pictet's commentary to Article 2 of the Con-
ventions:
Any difference arising between two States and leading to the
intervention of members of the armed forces is an armed
conflict within the meaning of Article 2, even if one of the
Parties denies the existence of a state of war. It makes no
difference how long the conflict lasts, how much slaughter
takes place, or how numerous are the participating forces; it
suffices for the armed forces of one Power to have captured
adversaries falling within the scope of Article 4.174
Some commentators assert that State practice since the adoption
of the Conventions has raised the bar, so to speak, on what types
of interstate hostilities qualify as armed conflict.175 Currently,
172. See id. at 83 (explaining how U.S. instruction on conditions triggering the law
of war includes a study of the concept of recognized belligerency, although State prac-
tice in this area appears to be waning).
173. See Presidential Military Order, Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain
Non-Citizens in the War against Terrorism (Nov. 13, 2001), available at http://www.
whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001 / 1Il/print/20011113-27.html (clearly asserting the
existence of "a state of armed conflict."). The order asserted two bases to support its
characterization of the conflict: (1) that the scale of the attacks against the United
States were of a magnitude consistent with armed conflict; and (2) the attacks required
the use of U.S. Armed Forces. See id.
174. GV IC COMMENTARY, supra note 100.
175. SeeWALTER GARY SHARPE, SR., CYBERSPACE AND THE USE OF FORCE 66-67 (1999)
(arguing that determining whether an armed conflict exists between States may now
require inquiry into the scope, intensity, and duration of the conflict); see also Eric Tal-
bot Jensen, Computer Attacks on Critical National Infrastructure: A Use of Force Invoking the
Right of SelfDefense, 38 STAN.J. INT'L L. 207 (2002); Michael N. Schmitt, Computer Network
Attack and the Use of Force in International Law: Thoughts On a Normative Framework, 37
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 885 (1999).
2005] 723
724 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol.28:681
our instruction to judge advocates retains the lower threshold
suggested by Pictet, such that the law of war operates across an
extremely broad range of interstate hostilities.176
It is therefore essential for operational judge advocates and
military commanders to have answers to these questions at the
earliest possible opportunity. The resolution of nearly all opera-
tional legal issues, including those related to treatment obliga-
tions, flow from these threshold determinations. It is notewor-
thy, however, thatjudge advocates at the operational and tactical
levels rarely are charged with the responsibility to make such
strategically relevant determinations. To the contrary, such de-
terminations are normally made by policymakers, and then opti-
mally, conveyed to judge advocates to advise commanders ac-
cordingly. In the case of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the adminis-
tration signaled early that the operation would be considered an
international armed conflict for the purposes of Article 2.117
Following the onset of occupation, however, such policy deter-
minations were not immediately forthcoming. In fact, even to-
day, they remained classified.
Once hostilities satisfy the conflict prong of the "Right Con-
flict/Right Person" test, judge advocates examine the relevant
participants to discern the applicable treatment standards of-
fered by the law of war - the right person prong. 17 Analysis
under this second prong typically involves gathering facts about
a group or individual on the battlefield and applying those facts
to definitions or qualifying criteria articulated under the Geneva
Conventions.' 79 As mentioned previously, analysis of the conflict
in Afghanistan immediately led policymakers and their attorneys
to consider how persons detained in that conflict would be cate-
gorized under the Third Geneva Convention. Yet as Section II
of this Article identifies in closing, judge advocates were not
privy to such guidance and interpretation concerning the
176. See supra text accompanying notes 148-67 (discussing whether conflicts in-
cluding Korea, Kosovo, Panama, and World War II triggered the law of war).
177. See, e.g., Executive Branch Memoranda on Status and Permissible Treatment of De-
tainees, 98 AM.J. INT'L L. 820, 828 (Sean Murphy ed., 2004) (noting that Major General
Geoffrey Miller reported to Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld that the Geneva Conven-
tions did apply to Iraq); Cdr. Gregory P. Noone et al., Prisoners of War in the 21st Century:
Issues in Moden Warfare, 50 NAVAL L. REv. 1, 5 n.7 (2004) (noting that Geneva Conven-
tions apply to U.S. actions in Iraq).
178. See LOW HANDBOOK, supra note 97, at 86-87.
179. See id.
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Fourth Convention and how it applied to the broad spectrum of
persons encountered, and in many instances detained, by U.S.
and Coalition forces in Iraq.180
The Fourth Geneva Convention is perhaps the most com-
plex of the four Geneva Conventions. A massive treaty, it is com-
prised of no less than 159 articles. 18 1 Unlike the first three Con-
ventions, the 1949 Fourth Convention was a revolutionary devel-
opment in the law of war. Each of the first three Conventions
built upon protections adopted in previous Geneva Conven-
tions. 8 2 These Conventions operated as refinements, offering
years of State practice and editing to inform their interpretation
- not so the Fourth.
Clearly a product of the unprecedented civilian toll exacted
by World War II, the drafters of the Fourth Convention realized
the "imperative necessity" of extending protections of the law of
war to civilians.'18  Incorporating affirmative protections for civil-
ians as victims of war, the Fourth Convention broke new ground
for positive, or treaty-based, law of war. Although custodial treat-
ment of civilians had received attention in prior law of war trea-
ties, this coverage could be argued to have been collateral to
protections intended primarily to benefit combatants.' 84 The
Army JAG School emphasizes the Fourth Convention's categori-
zation procedures over its substantive protections.185 It is hoped
180. See infta Pt. II.E.
181. See Geneva IV, supra note 4.
182. See Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in
Armies in the Field, Aug. 22, 1864, 22 Stat. 940, translated and reprinted in DIETRICH
SCHINDLER &JIRi TomAN, THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT 365 (1988) [hereinafter 1864
Convention]; Convention [No. III] for the Adaptation to Maritime Warfare of the Prin-
ciples of the Geneva Convention of 22 August 1864, July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1827, 1
Bevans 263, reprinted in SCHINDLER & ToMAN, supra, at 385; Convention Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War, July 27, 1929, 47 Stat. 2021, 118 U.N.T.S. 343 (discuss-
ing the use of the term "custodial treatment" to distinguish attention civilians receive in
the Hague Regulations with respect to targeting operations); see also 1907 Hague Con-
vention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its Annex, Regula-
tion Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Pmbl., 36 Stat. 2277, 205
Consol. T.S. 277, arts. 25-26 [hereinafter Hague IV].
183. See GC V COMMENTARY, supra note 100, at 5.
184. See Geneva IV, supra note 4; see also 1864 Convention, supra note 182, art. 5
("Inhabitants of the country who bring help to the wounded shall be respected and
shall remain free."). Thus, although civilians gained some protection under the Con-
vention, they were only protected in a collateral or derivative sense by virtue of their
support to wounded combatants.
185. See LOW HANDBOOK, supra note 97, at 146-48.
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that by understanding how properly to classify persons under the
Convention's definitional articles - answering the "right per-
son" prong - the relatively straightforward substantive articles
will present fewer interpretive challenges.
The organizational framework of the Fourth Convention as-
sists greatly in its application. The Convention consists of four
parts. The first is composed entirely of definitional articles and
provisions for application and cessation of application of the
Convention. l"6 Part I includes the common articles found in all
four Conventions. The remaining three parts lay out the protec-
tions reserved for specific groups of civilians. 187
Part II, entitled "General Protection of Populations against
Certain Consequences of War" offers the broadest set of protec-
tions available under the Fourth Convention. Article 13 defines
its coverage, announcing that Part II "cover[s] the whole of the
populations of the countries in conflict, without any distinction
.... "188 Although one might read "the whole populations of the
countries" to cover only citizens of warring States, the commen-
tary to Article 13 makes clear that coverage is broader. The com-
mentary states: "The provisions in Part II... apply not only to
protected persons, i.e., to enemy or other aliens and to neutrals,
as defined in Article 4 but also to the belligerents' own nationals;
it is that which makes these provisions exceptional in charac-
ter."189 As Pictet indicates, Part II protections are to be applied
to the broadest range of civilians, including neutrals. Thus, even
a State's own nationals, a class previously not covered by the law
of war, qualify for protection under Part II.
While the extent of Part II coverage, as Pictet observes, may
be exceptional, its substantive protections are not. Part II pro-
186. See Geneva IV, supra note 4, pt. I.
187. See id. pts. II-IV.
188. See id. art. 13.
189. GC IV COMMENTARY, supra note 100, at 118. We, and our School's publica-
tions and instructional material, make frequent reference to Pictet's commentary on
the Conventions. It is important, however, to emphasize that Pictet's work, though de-
tailed and widely respected, remains merely persuasive rather than authoritative.
Pictet's commentary was produced at the request of the sponsoring organization of the
1949 Geneva Conventions, the ICRC. See id. at 10-11. While the ICRC clearly holds a
special status in relation to the Conventions, it is not a State party to the Conventions.
As such, its statements on the meaning of the Conventions, again, while persuasive, do
not carry the weight of international law, as would the binding statements of Parties to
the Conventions.
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tections, listed in Articles 14 through 26, essentially shield civil-
ians from the immediate effects of hostilities. For instance, Arti-
cles 14 and 15 anticipate that Parties will establish protective
zones to harbor civilians and medical treatment facilities from
the effects of war. 9 ' Article 23 guarantees free passage of all
"consignments of medical and hospital stores and objects neces-
sary for religious worship intended only for civilians."19 ' Missing
from Part II coverage is any treatment arising from circum-
stances in which civilians find themselves in the custody of an
enemy State or under that State's control.
In fact, the Conventions limit such protections to a discreet
class of persons - so called "protected persons." Parts III and
IV of the Convention, present a massive catalogue of treatment
obligations toward protected persons. Yet as Pictet's commen-
tary notes above, the broad protective coverage of Part II exists
in stark contrast with the restricted scope of the Conventions'
protections in Parts III and IV.
Article 4 defines protected persons. At first reading, Article
4 presents a confusing picture. Article 4 first defines whom it
covers stating, "Persons protected by the Convention are those
who, at any given moment, and in any manner whatsoever, find
themselves, in case of a conflict or occupation, in the hands of a
Party to the conflict or Occupying Power of which they are not
Nationals."' 9 2 From this definition, it is at least clear that qualifi-
cation as a protected person requires satisfaction of both nation-
ality and geographic criteria. Put simply, protected persons
must not be nationals of the State that exercises control over
them. In fact, outside the context of occupation, they must be
nationals of the enemy of the State that controls them.
Pictet's commentary to Article 4 offers a helpful bifurcated
analysis of Article 4.19'3 The commentary separates protected
persons who so qualify by virtue of their presence in enemy terri-
tory from those who qualify by virtue of their presence in occu-
pied territory. The structure of Part III of the Fourth Conven-
tion, the substantive protections reserved for protected persons,
mirrors and thus supports Pictet's bifurcation. Section II of Part
190. See Geneva IV, supra note 4, arts. 14-15.
191. Id. art. 23.
192. Id. art. 4.
193. See GC IV COMMENTARY, supra note 100, at 46.
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III catalogs protections for persons who qualify for protected
person status by virtue of their presence in the enemy territory.
Section III lists protections for those who are protected persons
by virtue of their presence in occupied territory. Section I lists a
set of protections shared by both types of protected persons.
Helpfully, Article 4 also outlines whom it does not cover,
including: (1) nationals of States not bound by the Conven-
tions;' 94 (2) nationals of "a neutral State . . . in the territory of
one of a belligerent State";195 and (3) persons covered by either
the First, Second, or Third Geneva Conventions. 1 9 6 Notably ab-
sent from the definition of protected person is any reference to
so-called unlawful combatants. Perhaps more significantly,
though Article 4 announces several categories of persons not re-
garded as protected persons; unlawful combatants are not men-
tioned among those excluded from coverage. This omission
would be acute were it not for the provisions of Article 5.
Article 5 of the Fourth Geneva Convention permits Parties
to derogate from, or suspend, treatment guaranteed to pro-
tected persons in limited instances.'97 Such derogations are re-
served exclusively for so-called unlawful combatants. In parsing
available derogations, the Fourth Geneva Convention again
adopts a geographic bifurcation. The broadest range of deroga-
tions is reserved for treatment of alien protected persons. That
is, protected persons found in enemy territory may expect to
have any rights and privileges suspended, if exercise of those
194. See Geneva IV, supra note 4, art. 4. For a list of member States, see Int'l Com-
mittee of the Red Cross, States Party to the Main Treaties, (Nov. 12, 2004), at http://
www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteengO.nsf/htmlall/party-main-treaties/$File/IHL and_
otherrelated_Treaties.pdf. This exemption represents a minute category of persons:
citizens of the Nauru. At present, all U.N. member States have ratified or acceded to
the Geneva Conventions with the exception of the Nauru. See id.
195. Geneva IV, supra note 4, art. 4. Through this exclusion, the Fourth Conven-
tion presumes that neutrals receive adequate protection from arbitrary or inhumane
treatment during armed conflict from their functioning diplomatic representatives.
196. The first three Geneva Conventions employ definitional articles outlining
qualification criteria for their protections in a manner similar to Article 4 of the Fourth
Geneva Convention. See Geneva II, supra note 4, art. 4. Mirroring coverage in Article 4
of the Third Geneva Convention, Article 13 of the First Geneva Convention delineates
the bounds its protections for the wounded and sick. See, e.g., Geneva I, supra note 4,
art. 13; Geneva II, supra note 4, art. 13. As we have seen above, the POW qualification
criteria are found in Article 4 of the Third Geneva Convention. See supra notes 81-82
and accompanying text (discussing application of Article 4 in consideration of the
Taliban regime).
197. See Geneva IV, supra note 4, art. 5.
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rights and privileges would threaten the security of the host
State. 198 Such derogations are not without limitations. The final
Paragraph of Article 5 outlines a series on non-derogable treat-
ment standards, including humane treatment and a right to a
"fair and regular trial."'99 Article 5 further states that protec-
tions suspended under Article 5 shall be reinstated as soon as the
security situation permits.
200
In its second Paragraph, Article 5 reserves a much narrower
right of derogation in the context of occupation.2 °' In occupied
territory, protections for unlawful combatants who otherwise
qualify as protected persons may be suspended only with respect
to rights of communication.202 In addition to the humanitarian
limitations of the third Paragraph of Article 5, these derogations
may only be invoked "where absolute military security so re-
quires .....
As commentators have remarked, the language of Article 4
and the structure of Article 5 and Part III of the Fourth Geneva
Convention place them at odds with one another.20 4 Simply put,
in defining protected persons, Article 4 asks whether a person is
in the hands of his Nation's enemy.20 5 On its face, this defini-
tion carries no geographic criteria other than the exemptions
clause, which does not relate to nationals of the belligerents to
the conflict. 2 6 Yet the Article 5 derogation scheme only ad-
dresses hostile protected persons in two contexts: (1) as aliens
in enemy territory; and (2) as nationals of or neutrals in occu-
pied territory.207 Article 5 does not address hostile protected
persons in the hands of their Nation's enemy while in their own
unoccupied territory.
The organizational framework of Part III of the Fourth Ge-
neva Convention may be read to buttress the construct of Article







204. See Callen, supra note 1, at 1062-65; see alsoJinks, supra note 1, at 393-99.
205. See Geneva IV, supra note 4, art. 4.
206. See Geneva IV, supra note 4, art. 4; see also supra notes 194-96 and accompany-
ing text (describing the qualification criteria in Article 4).
207. See Geneva IV, supra note 4, art. 5.
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tions for alien protected persons in enemy territory (Section II),
protections for protected persons in occupied territory (Section
III) and protections for both (Section I), Part III seems to over-
look protections for hostile protected persons in their own terri-
tory.
To illustrate, consider an Afghan civilian under the control
of U.S. armed forces in Afghanistan. Under Article 4, this per-
son could easily be determined to be a protected person, as he
would be "in the hands of a Party to the conflict. '2°8 Further-
more, he would not fall under any of the disqualifying criteria of
Article 4.209 Yet considering that he is not in enemy territory
and that the U.S.-led Coalition has not been widely alleged to
have occupied Afghanistan, which section of Part III protects
him? Furthermore, if he commits acts hostile to the United
States, which paragraph of Article 5 authorizes derogation from
his protections to preserve the security of the U.S. forces detain-
ing him?
While commentators have suggested answers,210 the solu
tion for judge advocates lies within Department of the Army
Field Manual 27-10 ("FM 27-10"), the Army's law of war man-
ual. 21 1 Because the most current version of FM 27-10 was pub-
lished in July 1956, it does not offer commentary or analysis of
subsequent law of war treaties, such as the 1977 Additional Pro-
tocols to the Geneva Conventions. With the expanding reach
and acceptance of Protocol I and other recent law of war trea-
ties, the utility of FM 27-10 is increasingly in question. However,
with respect to the 1949 Conventions, FM 27-10 remains authori-
tative.
Addressing protected persons, FM 27-10 states: "[T]hose
protected by [the Fourth Geneva Convention] include all per-
sons who have engaged in hostile or belligerent conduct but
who are not entitled to treatment as prisoners of war."212 The
following Paragraph is quick to explain the applicability, how-
ever, of the Article 5 derogations with respect to hostile pro-
211tected persons. 1 Paragraph 248(a) reproduces Article 5 in its
208. Id.
209. See supra notes 194-96 and accompanying text.
210. See Callen, supra note 1, at 1028; see alsoJinks, supra note 1, at 374-75.
211. See FM 27-10, LAw OF LAND WARFARE, supra note 128.
212. Id. at 98.
213. See id. at 99, 248.
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entirety, including the derogation provisions for hostile pro-
tected persons in alien territory and those in occupied territory.
Importantly, in commentary on Article 5, Paragraph 248 (b) pro-
vides:
Other area. Where, in territories other than those mentioned
in (a) above, a Party to the conflict is satisfied that an individ-
ual protected person is definitely suspected of or engaged in
activities hostile to the security of the State, such individual
person is similarly not entitled to claim such rights and privi-
leges under [the Fourth Geneva Convention] as would, if ex-
ercised in favor of such individual person, be prejudicial to
the security of such State. 2 14
By its title, and its explanation thereof, Paragraphs 247 and
248(b) simultaneously resolve the issue of hostile civilians as pro-
tected persons, as well as hostile protected persons in their own
territory for members of the DOD.2 15 Admittedly, Paragraph
248 does not cite authority for reading a right to derogate into
Article 5, but by reserving a right to derogate, the manual clearly
indicates an initial determination that protected persons do exist
in what otherwise is a statutory void.2 16
2. The Department of Defense Law of War Program
Difficulties experienced by judge advocates in interpreting
and applying .the law of war are frequently diffused, but admit-
tedly sometimes complicated, by the DOD Law of War Program.
Expressed in a pair of documents, the program includes direc-
tions to the component services of the DOD, instructing them
how to implement and train students in the law of war. For
judge advocates, the most important aspect of the program is the
policy regarding application of the law of war. Department of
Defense Directive ("DODD") 5100.77 charges the heads of its
components to ensure that their members "comply with the law
of war during all armed conflicts, however such conflicts are
characterized, and with the principles and spirit of the law of war
during all other operations." '217 The implementing instruction
of DODD 5100.77 repeats the charge qualifying, however, that
214. Id.
215. See id. at 98-99, 247-48.
216. Seeeid. at 99, 248.
217. DODD 5100.77, supra note 13.
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observance of the law of war may, in such operations, may be
suspended when "otherwise directed by competent authori-
ties.''2t  Thus, the promise to apply the law of war broadly re-
mains qualified by executive fiat.2 19
In our classrooms, judge advocates (including those new to
the School and those returning with experience applying the
Law of War Program), express frustration with the program's
ambiguity. Many find understanding or complying with the pro-
gram difficult without a clear delineation' between what the
United States regards as a "principle" or "spirit" and what does
not so qualify. Other judge advocates have questioned, in writ-
ing, the utility and clarity of the program. 221
D. Guantanamo Bay Detainees
Throughout this Article we have referred to the continual
challenges that judge advocates faced with respect to categoriza-
218. U.S. DOD, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 5810.01B, Imple-
mentation of the DOD Law of War Program (Mar. 25, 2002).
219. International law is replete with States' assurances and promises to comply
with their obligations under international humanitarian law. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1195,
U.N. SCOR, 3925th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1195 (1998) [hereinafter S.C. Res. 1195];
S.C. Res. 1483, U.N. SCOR, 4761st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1483 (2003) [hereinafter
S.C. Res. 1483]. Such statements often include explicit reference to the Geneva Con-
ventions. See U.N. Res. 1195, supra; see also U.N. Res. 1483, supra. What these statements
do not state clearly, or where they are liable to mislead, is that such promises do not
guarantee application of the law of war at all. States' obligations under the law of war,
including the Geneva Conventions, include those laws' built-in triggering mechanisms.
See Geneva IV, supra note 4, art. 2. Absent a committed and unambiguous application
of relevant portions of the Conventions to a conflict, the issue of their application re-
mains unresolved by blanket statements of commitment. Thus, if a State agrees to
abide by its obligations under the Geneva Conventions wholesale, that State is simulta-
neously issuing a caveat. That is, honoring its obligations would only include applying
the Conventions provisions to conflicts and Parties to which that State itself views the
Conventions applicable through the so-called triggering mechanisms of Common Arti-
cle 2 and Article 1 (4) of the Additional Protocols to the Conventions. Furthermore, the
Conventions bring a second filter to their application under such a promise. Even
when triggered, the Conventions apportion their most significant protections to very
discreet groups of persons on the battlefield (e.g., prisoners of war, and protected per-
sons). The effect of such statements and promises, therefore, is to provide precious
little clarity or commitment, doing little to resolve the legal ambiguities faced by judge
advocates.
220. See, e.g., Maj. Timothy Bulman, A Dangerous Guessing Game Disguised As Enlight-
ened Policy: United States Law of War Obligations During Military Operations Other Than War,
159 MIL. L. Rv. 152 (1999). But see W. Hays Parks, Rules of Conduct During Operations
Other Than War: The Law of War Does Apply, AM. DIPL. (2001), at http://www.unc.edu/
depts/diplomat/.
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tion of the participants. We have also alluded to the fact that
because certain subjects remained unaddressed, conscientious
military officers other than judge advocates often "borrowed"
written products and policies from other theaters of operation in
attempts to fill in gaps. For these reasons, consideration of poli-
cies developed at Guantanamo Bay and the legal analysis under-
girding those policies is relevant for consideration.
The Guantanamo Bay detention facility ultimately held
more than 600 detainees. 221 The question of how detainees
would be interrogated was apparently unanswered for some
time.22 2 As noted earlier, the Army, and by extension the other
services, had provided guidance on interrogation techniques for
years. This guidance existed primarily in the form of Army Field
Manual 34-52 ("FM 34-52").223 In effect since at least 1987, and
adopted by the other services, FM 34-52 underwent substantial
revision and legal review in 1992.224 In essence, FM 34-52
prescribes specific approaches and techniques for the interroga-
tion of prisoners of war. In addition, Army Regulation 190-8
provides for the treatment of captured, detained, and interned
persons, directing humane treatment and setting strong prohibi-
tions regarding certain activities.225
In the fall of 2002, as interrogations were conducted on de-
tainees at Guantanamo Bay, it became apparent that many de-
tainees offered more resistance to established approaches and
techniques than had been anticipated. In response to this devel-
opment, the Director of Intelligence Operations for Combined
Joint Task Force 170, who was in charge of interrogation opera-
tions at the facility, authored a memorandum stating that many
of the detainees had shown great resistance and that the com-
mand was seeking to employ more effective counter-resistance
221. See Laura Parker, Spy Case Was a "Life-altering Experience" For Airman, USA To-
DAY, Oct. 18, 2004, at 2A.
222. See, e.g., K. Elizabeth Dahlstrom, The Executive Policy Toward Detention and Trial
of Foreign Citizens at Guantanamo Bay, 21 BERKELEYJ. INT'L L. 662, 681-82 (2003) (describ-
ing differing views towards law covering interrogation of detainees at Guantanamo
Bay).
223. See U.S. DEP'T OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 34-52, INTELLIGENCE INTERROGA-
TION (May 8, 1987).
224. See U.S. DEP'T OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 34-52, INTELLIGENCE INTERROGA-
TION (Sept. 28, 1992) [hereinafter FM 34-52].
225. See AR 190-8, supra note 63.
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techniques.226
The request was forwarded to the Command Judge Advo-
cate for legal review. In short, she determined that: (1) interna-
tional law (and therefore the Geneva Conventions) did not ap-
ply to the situation; (2) military necessity required more strin-
gent counter-measures; and (3) the requested counter-measures
did not violate applicable federal law. Significantly, the Com-
mand Judge Advocate requested legal review of her determina-
tions from higher headquarters.227
The Command Judge Advocate's legal analysis, a compre-
hensive document almost seven pages in length, was based upon
several significant premises. The first was that the Geneva Con-
ventions did not apply to these detainees. Indeed, she noted,
the President had determined in his February 7, 2002 directive
that detainees were not enemy prisoners of war.2 28 Despite this
determination, she noted that detainees "must be treated hu-
manely and, subject to military necessity, in accordance with the
principles of [the Geneva Conventions] ."229 Adopting the same
line of reasoning, she noted that FM 34-52 was based upon the
Geneva Conventions, and because the detainees were not POWs,
the Conventions did not apply to them, so the regulation was not
binding.23 ° After a lengthy discussion of many bodies and facets
of international law, she noted that "no international body of law
directly applies. ' 231 Finally, she considered the application of
domestic law extensively, concluding ultimately that "the pro-
posed strategies [did] not violate applicable federal law. 232
This legal review was forwarded to and endorsed by the
command to the General Counsel of the DOD. On November
27, 2002, the General Counsel's command recommended, "as a
matter of policy," that the Secretary of Defense authorize seven-
teen of the twenty techniques. 233 The Secretary of Defense did
226. See Memorandum from Lt. Col. Jerald Phifer, J2, to Commander, JTF 170,
Request for Approval of Counter-Resistance Strategies (Oct. 11, 2002), available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun2004/d2004O622doc3.pdf [hereinafter J2 Inter-
rogation Request].






233. Haynes Counter-Resistance Memo, supra note 110.
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so on December 2, 2002.234
Pursuant to the objections of uniformed attorneys, the Sec-
retary of Defense rescinded the memorandum on January 15,
2002, specifically rescinding the authority for so-called category
II and III techniques.235 On that same date, he directed the
DOD General Counsel to establish a working group within the
DOD to assess the legal, policy, and operational issues relating to
the interrogations of detainees held by the U.S. Armed Forces in
the war on terrorism. 236 The Working Group, issued an exten-
sive report on April 4, 2003, detailing legal, historical, policy and
operational considerations, as well as specific findings, conclu-
sions, and recommendations. 23 7
To this point, it appears that the Fourth Geneva Conven-
tion, save Common Article 3, had yet to be considered in any
substantive sense, at least in relation to the treatment of Guanta-
namo detainees. Certainly none of the guidance offered regard-
ing detainee operations specifically addressed the Fourth Ge-
neva Convention. First, one might have implied an unspoken
determination that the Fourth Convention, though clearly trig-
gered by the President's determination, was inapplicable. Such
a reading would be reinforced by the driving motivation of the
memoranda - protecting the policymakers and commanders
from prosecution under the War Crimes Act.238 In any event,
where the administration had exhaustively analyzed and inter-
preted the Third Geneva Convention for purposes of operations
in Afghanistan, the Fourth Geneva Convention was left largely
untreated.
234. See Final Report of the Independent Panel to Review DOD Detention Opera-
tions 7 (Aug. 2004), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Aug2004/
d2004O824finalreport.pdf [hereinafter Final Report 2004].
235. See Memorandum from Secretary of Defense to General Counsel, DOD, De-
tainee Interrogations (Jan. 15, 2003), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/
Jun2004/d20040622doc6.pdf. Category II and III techniques were proposed in the
JTF-170 intelligence officer's request for approval of harsher techniques. SeeJ2 Interro-
gation Request, supra note 226. In August 2004, the DOD released an independent
investigation conducted by former Secretary of Defense, James Schlesinger. See Final
Report 2004, supra note 187. Mr. Schlesinger noted that Secretary Rumsfeld revoked
his earlier approval to use some of particularly harsh interrogation techniques. See id. at
35. The report states that the Navy General Counsel was concerned about the approved
techniques. See id.
236. See Final Report 2004, supra note 187, at 35.
237. See Working Group Report, supra note 91.
238. See, e.g., Taft Memo, supra note 65, at 3; Ashcroft Letter, supra note 75.
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E. Addressing the Problem in Iraq
Just as was the case with respect to Operation Enduring
Freedom in Afghanistan and the detention operations of Coali-
tion Joint Task Force 170 ("CJTF-170") at Guantanamo, exami-
nation of the initial phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom reveals
little, if any, consideration of the Fourth Geneva Convention.
Indeed, the Army JAG Corps' lessons-learned manual covering
the major combat phases of Operation Iraqi Freedom gives scant
attention to issues associated with the Fourth Geneva Conven-
tion.23 9 Part and parcel with this failure was the DOD's per-
ceived failure to plan for post conflict operations, after major
combat operations had ended. This perceived failure earned
DOD officials criticism from many circles. 240
As early as the fall of 2002, judge advocates began to pre-
pare for what they anticipated to be a belligerent occupation of
Iraq. In preparation for this eventually, they set about acquiring
as many legal resources and as much legal history as they could
find: they went so far as to contact the JAG School Librarian in
order to acquire documents related to World War II occupation
experiences in Germany and Japan. 24 ' They included occupa-
tion issues in the military exercises preceding their deployment
into the Iraqi theater and, based on assumptions that they would
encounter common criminals and other detainees in addition to
enemy prisoners of war, judge advocates wrote one of the first
orders issued by the U.S. Army's Fifth U.S. Corps, establishing a
detention system.
24 2
239. A CLAMO volume of lessons learned during the occupation and subsequent
phases of operations in Iraq is in development at the time of writing. It is expected to
published by Summer 2005.
240. See, e.g., Michiko Kakutani, Following a Paper Trail to the Roots of Torture, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 8, 2005, at 1; Rice Takes Helm With Chance to Right Second-term Course, USA
TODAY, Jan. 19, 2005, at 1OA; David E. Sanger & Richard W. Stevenson, Bush Supporters
Are Split On How to Pursue Iraq Plan, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2004, at All.
241. See Interview with Dan Lavering, Librarian, The Army Judge Advocate Gen-
eral's Legal Center & School, in Charlottesville, Virginia (Nov. 23, 2004) (on file with
authors). Mr. Laving recalls requests from several judge advocates, from separate com-
mands and headquarters requesting archival materials related to occupation law, espe-
cially U.S. Army experience during World War II. See id. Mr. Lavering recalls providing,
among other sources, copies of Army Field Manual 27-5, Civil Affair Military Govern-
ment, dated 1940. See id.
242. See Interview with Maj. Steve Cullen, The ArmyJudge Advocate General's Le-
gal Center & School, Center for Law and Military Operations, in Charlottesville, Vir-
ginia (Nov. 23, 2004) (on file with authors). Maj. Cullen attended the United States
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Among other provisions, this order specifically applied the
Geneva Conventions, and borrowing from approaches previ-
ously used by U.S. judge advocates in Kosovo, also established a
magistrate review requirement within twenty-one days of deten-
tion. This order grew eventually into a much more comprehen-
sive effort that, in August 2003, established capture/detention
cards, created Article 78, Geneva Convention IV review and ap-
peal boards, produced internment orders, and implemented a
criminal review board that effectively functioned as a provost
court (by establishing maximum time served limits for adminis-
trative release). It appears that this was the first time that Article
78 boards and processes had ever been implemented.243
If actual combat operations with a high contracting Party to
the Conventions were not enough to raise the prospect of appli-
cation of the Fourth Geneva Convention, then a de facto occu-
pation, coupled with the prospect of processing, detaining and
interrogating thousands of Iraqi and other captured personnel,
certainly brought the Fourth Convention to the fore. At this
point, the questions raised by failure to address the Fourth Ge-
neva Convention at policy levels, such as whether unlawful com-
batants should be regarded as extra-conventional persons be-
came too large to ignore. They manifested themselves overtly
within the context of detainee operations. Judge advocates, with
no guidance from within the theater of operations or from
outside, sought to provide the answers.
Since the majority of Fourth Geneva Convention-related is-
sues manifested themselves in the area of detainee operations,
judge advocates chose affirmatively to insert themselves into the
process through attempts at the formulation of local policies re-
garding detainees. It is of paramount importance to note that,
prior to judge advocates' involvement in policy formulation,
there were no such policies in place. It is also important to note
that they were not requested or tasked to formulate such poli-
Army V Corps Office of the Staff Judge Advocate (OSJA) after action review in Heidel-
berg, Germany, on May 18, 2004. Among topics discussed and reviewed were V Corps
preparations, prior to deployment to Iraq as Headquarters CJTF-7, to incorporate legal
standards of the Fourth Geneva Convention into plans. See id. Specifically, the OSJA
operational law attorney assigned to the Corps Plans Section, incorporated the Fourth
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cies. Rather, they noted an absence of guidance and were there-
fore concerned that some limitations should be placed on pro-
spective detention activities. Lastly, it appears that legal person-
nel in theater did not review or employ several of the more
controversial documents, such as the "Gonzales Memo '244 and
the DOD Working Group Report.245
Perhaps more important than anything else, however, were
the legal premises from which they began their efforts. From all
available evidence, it was clear that judge advocates took the view
from the outset of operations in Iraq that the nature of the con-
flict was international armed conflict and that the Third and
Fourth Geneva Conventions were therefore applicable. Indeed,
the senior military attorney for Combined Joint Task Force 7 in
Iraq testified that, in his view, the totality of the Third and
Fourth Geneva Conventions applied to occupation operations in
Iraq.2 "46 As a consequence of this determination, individuals who
failed to meet the criteria to be accorded POW status under Arti-
cle 4 of the Third Geneva Convention remained protected per-
sons under the Fourth Convention.
Because no preexisting policies or guidance reflected these
views, judge advocates began to draft policies for their com-
manders and supported units. In a series of draft internal mem-
oranda, judge advocates articulated clearly that operations were
being conducted in a theater of war in which the Geneva Con-
ventions were applicable.247 The policies expressly advised that
Coalition forces treat all persons under their control humanely,
ensuring that the rights of protected persons were preserved. 248
Exhibiting an appreciation of the law regarding protected per-
sons under the Fourth Geneva Convention, draft policies also
contained language regarding derogations under Article 5 of the
Fourth Convention, providing, in essence, that detainees who
posed security risks to the Coalition may be regarded as having
forfeited rights of communication.249
244. See Gonzales Torture Statute Memo, supra note 110.
245. See Working Group Report, supra note 110.
246. See Warren Statement, supra note 8, at 4.
247. See id.
248. See id.
249. Reports indicate the many fighters encountered by coalition forces were not
Iraqi nationals, but rather non-Iraqi fighters either in place at the time of invasion or
who infiltrated to participate in combat. See Thomas E. Ricks, Rebels Aided By Allies in
Syria, U.S. Says; Baathists Reportedly Relay Money, Support, WASH. PosT, Dec. 8, 2004, at A01
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By the time that these drafts were finally approved, the local
policies bore little resemblance to public perceptions of their
contents. As noted above, the policies, as approved, invoked spe-
cifically the application of the Geneva Conventions, going so far
as to cite specific articles of the Fourth Geneva Convention. The
policies opined exactly that detainees were protected persons
under the purview of the Fourth Geneva Convention and dis-
cussed the possible use of derogations under Article 5.
Lastly, and perhaps a bit beyond the purview of this Paper,
the policies attempted to set clear controls and limits on interro-
gation approaches and techniques - limiting approved tech-
niques to those approved by Army Field Manuals (after extensive
legal review at the highest levels long before the instant conflict)
for use on prisoners of war, who receive the highest protections
under international law. Ultimately, the policies employed from
October 2003 through May 2004, were much more conservative
in approach and protections than even the Field Manual, which,
as noted above contemplated application to prisoners of war.
They also installed unprecedented oversight and control mea-
sures.
In summary, though the concept of extra-conventional per-
sons had clearly been introduced into the debate about the sta-
tus of Parties in the Iraqi theater of operations, it is clear that
military judge advocates either resisted the temptation to attach
such a label to persons in the theater, or ignored it in favor of a
more cautious approach under international law. That ap-
proach, the extension of the maximum protections under the
circumstances, seems to have served them and the command
well.
CONCLUSION
The United States' recent wartime experience with the law
of war has forged of a new generation of judge advocates. These
officers, and their supporting paralegals, have gained an impres-
(discussing fighters coming across Syrian border). During the subsequent occupation,
analyzed purely under Article 4 of the Fourth Convention, such persons might meet the
nationality criteria required for protected person status (e.g., as neutral nationals in
occupied territory in the case ofJordanian citizens). Yet according such status to non-
Iraqi fighters seems to strain a major goal of the Fourth Convention, namely, ensuring
minimum treatment standards for persons caught up in conflict. Fighters infiltrating
into Iraq, to the contrary, injected themselves into the conflict.
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sive appreciation and level of understanding of the legal issues
associated with military operations. Moreover, these judge advo-
cates exhibit a clear understanding of the most complex interna-
tional law issues.
At the same time, review of these recent operations has
demonstrated disparate approaches to the law of war within the
executive branch. We have shown that the Global War on Ter-
rorism forced executive agencies and lawyers, many not histori-
cally associated with the law of war, to grapple with its complexi-
ties, quirks, and shortcomings. With respect to the conflict with
the Taliban in Afghanistan, these officials determined that the
United States would apply the Geneva Conventions. Yet employ-
ing the qualification criteria of the Third Geneva Convention,
officials concluded that Taliban fighters did not qualify for pro-
tection as prisoners of war. Simultaneously, these officials either
declined to consider, or more likely excluded, these same fight-
ers from protection under the Fourth Geneva Convention, creat-
ing what we have termed "extra-conventional persons."
We have shown that, subsequent to the above determina-
tions, judge advocates, educated and trained to apply the law of
war, faced challenges classifying similar fighters in another thea-
ter of conflict. In Operation Iraqi Freedom, judge advocates
participated in a conflict to which, like Afghanistan, the Geneva
Conventions were determined to apply as a matter of law. More-
over, as in Afghanistan, judge advocates encountered fighters
that, because of their appearance and battlefield conduct would
not qualify for protection under the Third Geneva Convention.
Yet with the precedent for treatment of such unlawful combat-
ants as "extra-conventional persons" laid by policymakers, we
have shown that judge advocates declined to do so. To the con-
trary, judge advocates anticipated, consistent with longstanding
doctrine, that failure to qualify as prisoners of war was not the
end of the analysis under the Conventions. Rather, judge advo-
cates analyzed these fighters under the Fourth Geneva Conven-
tion, determining those who met the definitional criteria of Arti-
cle 4 to be protected persons. Judge advocates then employed
derogations provided for by the Conventions and legal doctrine
to balance the security needs of their commanders and units
with the humanitarian spirit and provisions of the Conventions.
Judge advocates will likely continue to experience discon-
nects between policy and law. These disconnects may be inevita-
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ble as the United States and its Coalition partners participate in
non-traditional operations that test accepted international law
precepts. We cannot speculate whether international law will
change to comport with new threats or the asymmetric battle-
field. If past practice is a portent of the future, such changes will
be a long time in coming.
In this likely scenario, the decisions of policy makers will
play similarly significant roles. If this is indeed the case, we are
confident that judge advocates will continue to perform impres-
sively. As we believe this piece has illustrated, their education
and training prepared them well for the challenges they faced in
Iraq and elsewhere and prepares them for the challenges they
will certainly face in the future.
